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Summary 
Overview 
South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is one of the United States’ 
most important strategic and economic partners in Asia, and since 2009 relations between the two 
countries arguably have been at their most robust state in decades. Several factors drive 
congressional interest in South Korea-related issues. First, the United States and South Korea 
have been military allies since the early 1950s. The United States is committed to helping South 
Korea defend itself, particularly against any aggression from North Korea. Approximately 28,500 
U.S. troops are based in the ROK and South Korea is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” 
Second, Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. 
Third, the two countries’ economies are closely entwined and are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States’ seventh-largest trading 
partner and the United States is South Korea’s second-largest trading partner. South Korea has 
repeatedly expressed interest in and consulted with the United States on possibly joining the U.S.-
led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, which has been signed, but not yet 
ratified by the current 12 participants. 
Strategic Cooperation and the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic concern of the U.S.-South Korean 
relationship. Under South Korean President Park Geun-hye, Seoul and Washington have 
maintained tight coordination over North Korea policy, following a joint approach that contains 
elements of pressure and engagement. In response to Pyongyang’s perceived intransigence and 
provocative behavior, Washington and Seoul have placed significant emphasis on the harder 
elements of their approach, particularly following North Korea’s two nuclear tests and multiple 
missile launches in 2016.  
Most notably, in 2016 (1) the two countries successfully pushed to expand UNSC sanctions and 
launched a global campaign to persuade other countries to curtail relations with North Korea; (2) 
they announced that they would deploy the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea, a step that the two countries had deferred 
for months and that China has protested loudly; and (3) Seoul shut down the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex, an 11-year-old industrial park located in North Korea just across the demilitarized zone 
where more than 120 South Korean manufacturers employed over 50,000 North Korean workers. 
Notwithstanding the recent moves against North Korea, some critics say that the Obama 
Administration’s policy has applied insufficient pressure on Pyongyang to change its behavior, 
while others argue that it has provided insufficient incentives.  
Since 2009, the United States and South Korea have accelerated steps to reform the U.S.-ROK 
alliance. Washington and Seoul are relocating U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula and boosting 
ROK defense capabilities. Provocations from North Korea have propelled more integrated 
bilateral planning for responding to possible contingencies, for instance by adopting policies to 
respond more swiftly and forcefully to attacks and by deploying the THAAD system in South 
Korea. In a related development, in 2014 the United States and South Korea agreed to delay for 
the second time a 2007 agreement to transfer wartime operational control (Opcon) from U.S. to 
ROK forces. According to congressional testimony by U.S. military officials, South Korea pays 
roughly half of the non-personnel costs of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea. 
On broad strategic matters in East Asia, while South Korean and U.S. perspectives overlap, there 
are areas of significant differences. For instance, South Korea often hesitates to take steps that 
antagonize China and has shown mistrust of Japan’s efforts to expand its military capabilities. 
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North Korea’s 2016 nuclear weapons tests and missile launches, however, potentially have shifted 
the geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia in ways that could bring the United States and South 
Korea closer together on the best approaches to China and Japan. 
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his report contains two main parts: a section describing recent events and a longer 
background section on key elements of the U.S.-South Korea relationship. The end of the 
report provides a list of CRS products on South Korea and North Korea. For a map of the 
Korean Peninsula, see Figure 2 below. The report identifies South Korean individuals by using 
their last name first. For a two-page summary of U.S.-South Korea relations, see CRS In Focus 
IF10165, South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark E. Manyin et al.  
Major Developments in 2016 
The Overall State of U.S.-South Korea Relations 
Since 2009, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the 
Republic of Korea, or ROK) arguably have been at their most robust since the formation of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance in 1953. Cooperation on North Korea policy has been particularly close, and 
the two countries have adjusted the alliance in the face of a changing threat from Pyongyang, 
particularly following North Korea’s actions in 2016, which include nuclear weapons tests (its 
fourth and fifth) in January and September 2016, a satellite launch in February 2016, and over 
two dozen ballistic missile tests, including an August 2016 test of a submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM). All of these actions violated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions. 
Notwithstanding the overall positive state of the relationship, the United States and South Korea 
occasionally have disagreed on key issues, most prominently on how to handle South Korea-
Japan relations and on how to respond to China’s rise. Additionally, for much of her presidency, 
South Korean President Park Geun-hye (pronounced “pahk gun-hay”) promoted a number of 
initiatives that potentially could have acted at cross-purposes with U.S. policies to increase 
pressure on Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and missile launches in 2016, 
however, appear to have eased differences between Seoul’s and Washington’s approaches to 
North Korea and many of their differences on China. North Korea’s actions, combined with 
improvement in South Korea-Japan relations since late 2015, also have set the stage for the 
expanded strategic cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo on North Korea that U.S. officials long 
have desired.  
North Korea Policy Coordination  
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean 
relationship, and since 2009 the two allies in effect have pursued a joint approach toward 
Pyongyang. Following Pyongyang’s January 2016 nuclear weapons test and February 2016 
satellite launch, Washington and Seoul hardened their approach, taking a number of coordinated 
actions designed to rally international support for “compelling the [North Korean] regime to 
return to ... negotiations on denuclearization.”1 The two countries pushed for the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) to impose more stringent sanctions on the DPRK regime, a campaign 
that resulted in the UNSC’s unanimous adoption on March 2 of Resolution 2270.2 In July 2016, 
the United States and South Korea announced that they would deploy a U.S. Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea, a step 
                                                 
1 State Department, “Joint Statement of the 2016 United States - Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers' 
Meeting,” October 19, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263340.htm.  
2 For the text of Resolution 2270, go to http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/2270%282016%29.  
T 
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that the two allies had deferred for months and that China has protested loudly. U.S.-South Korea-
Japan coordination over approaches to North Korea also has increased over the course of 2016. In 
the months following the passage of UNSC Resolution 2270, the United States and South Korea 
have focused attention on the resolution’s implementation, particularly by China, which since 
2010 is believed to have accounted for more than two-thirds of North Korea’s total trade.3 In 
October 2016, they launched a bilateral North Korean Human Rights Consultation mechanism. 
More broadly, they have launched a coordinated global campaign, at times working with 
countries such as Japan, to persuade other countries to curtail relations with North Korea, 
particularly those such as the DPRK’s state-run labor export programs that are believed to 
generate income for the government in Pyongyang.4  
South Korea at a Glance 
Head of State: President Park Geun-hye (elected 
December 2012; limited to one five-year term) 
Ruling Party: Saenuri (New Frontier) Party (NFP) 
Largest Opposition Party: Minjoo (Democratic) Party  
Size: Slightly larger than Indiana 
Arable Land: 15.6% 
 
Population: 49 million (North Korea = 24.9 million) 
Population Growth Rate: 0.14% (U.S. = 0.78%) 
Portion of Population Younger than 25: 27% (U.S. = 
33%) 
Fertility Rate: 1.25 children born per woman  
(U.S. = 1.87)  
Life Expectancy: 80 years (U.S. = 79.7 yrs.; North 
Korea = 70.1 yrs.) 
Infant Mortality: 3.9 deaths/1,000 live births 
(U.S. = 5.9; North Korea = 23.7) 
 
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity):5 $1.85 trillion; 
world’s 14th-largest economy (U.S. = $17.97 trillion; 
North Korea = $40 billion (2013 est.))  
GDP Per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity): 
$36,700 (U.S. = $56,300; North Korea = $1,800 
(2013 est.)) 
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, March 10, 2016. 
Additionally, in the aftermath of North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test, Congress passed and 
on February 18 President Obama signed H.R. 757/P.L. 114-122, the North Korea Sanctions 
Enforcement Act of 2016, which expands unilateral U.S. sanctions against Pyongyang and other 
entities working with the North Korean government. Among the steps the Obama Administration 
has taken to implement P.L. 114-122 have been a June 2016 determination by the Secretary of the 
Treasury that North Korea is a jurisdiction of money laundering concern, and a July 2016 State 
Department report designating Kim Jong-un and senior North Korean officials as personally 
responsible for widespread human rights violations.6 
                                                 
3 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 can be found at http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm. 
4 State Department, “Joint Statement of the 2016 United States - Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers' 
Meeting,” October 19, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263340.htm.  
5 The purchasing power parity method of calculating GDP accounts for how much people can buy for their money in a 
given country. Instead of simply measuring total output, the PPP GDP method attempts to gauge how much a person 
would have to pay in the local currency for a set basket of goods. That amount is then converted to the equivalent value 
in U.S. dollars, so that analysts can make cross-country standard of living comparisons. 
6 State Department, “Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea,” July 6, 2016, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/259366.htm.  
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Inter-Korean Relations 
North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear weapon test and subsequent satellite launch prompted 
President Park to alter her previous North Korea policy, which contained a mixture of pressure 
and engagement tactics, in favor of a significantly tougher approach. In the most tangible move, 
Seoul shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, an 11-year-old industrial park located just 
across the demilitarized zone in North Korea where more than 120 South Korean manufacturers 
employed over 50,000 North Korean workers. The complex, which was established in part to be 
an example for market-oriented reforms in North Korea, was the last physical remnant of the 
inter-Korean cooperation that sprouted during the years of Seoul’s “sunshine policy” in 2000-
2008. It also, however, provided the North Korean government with access to a stream of hard 
currency, estimated to be worth over $500 million in total since the complex opened in 2004. In 
response to Seoul's move, Pyongyang threatened future “consequences” and announced that it 
would confiscate all assets in the park, sever two inter-Korean military hotlines, and restore 
military control over the KIC zone.  
In a February 2016 speech before the National Assembly, President Park said the KIC’s 
suspension was “only the beginning” of South Korea’s punitive actions, which would be designed 
to “create an environment in which the North keenly realizes that nuclear development does not 
offer the path to survival but will merely hasten the regime’s collapse, and therefore has no choice 
but to change of its own volition.”7 Subsequently, South Korea announced new unilateral 
sanctions on North Korea, including a refusal to allow ships that have travelled to North Korea 
within the previous six months to dock in South Korea. Park’s moves have initiated a period of 
high tension between North and South Korea, and Park has warned of potential attacks by the 
North.  
Following North Korea’s September 2016 test, President Park stated that “the only thing [the] 
Kim Jong-un regime will earn from conducting nuclear tests is stronger sanctions by the 
international community and further isolation.” She promised that her government “ ... will seek 
additional, tougher sanctions by the U.N. Security Council and bilaterally, as well as increase 
pressure on North Korea by using all possible measures in order to make the North abandon its 
nuclear program.”8 Her government warned that 
The more reckless provocations the DPRK conducts, the stronger international sanctions 




In October 2016, following a small increase in elite defections during the year, President Park 
issued an unprecedented appeal encouraging North Koreans to defect, reportedly saying, “please 
come to the bosom of freedom in the South.”10 Later that same month, South Korean Foreign 
Minister Yun Byung-se stated that the U.S. and South Korea recognize the “need to accelerate 
change in North Korea,” by taking steps such as pressuring the country to improve its human 
                                                 
7 “Address by President Park Geun-hye to the National Assembly on State Affairs,” South Korean Office of the 
President, February 16, 2016. 
8 The Blue House, “President Park Geun-hye`s Message on the (Fifth) Nuclear Test by North Korea, September 9, 
2016, available at english1.president.go.kr.  
9 The Blue House, “Statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea on the DPRK’s Fifth Nuclear Test,” 
September 9, 2016, available at english1.president.go.kr.  
10 Anna Fifield. “Two more North Koreans said to defect, but don’t hold your breath for the collapse,” October 6, 2016, 
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/two-more-north-koreans-said-to-defect-but-dont-hold-your-
breath-for-the-collapse/2016/10/06/336ab92d-4774-4635-aa65-241227510181_story.html.  
U.S.-South Korea Relations 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
rights record and increasing the penetration of outside information into North Korea.11 As part of 
its response to South Korea’s moves and statements, North Korea’s state-run media have issued a 
number of threats against South Korea as well as vulgarities and language personally criticizing 
President Park.  
In another sign of hardening attitudes toward North Korea, the Park government in early 
September 2016 announced that due to North Korea’s continued provocations, South Korea was 
unlikely to provide direct humanitarian assistance—or allow South Korean organizations to 
provide assistance—to help North Korea deal with large-scale flooding that occurred earlier in the 
month.12 Also, in March 2016, by a 220-0 vote, South Korea’s National Assembly passed a North 
Korean human rights bill. The bill was first introduced in 2005, the year after Congress passed 
and President George W. Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights Act (H.R. 4011/P.L. 108-
333).13 The South Korean bill generally was championed by South Korean conservative groups 
and opposed by progressives. Among other steps, the bill requires the government to develop a 
human rights promotion plan and establishes a foundation that is charged with documenting 
North Korean human rights abuses.14 (For more on cooperation over North Korea and inter-
Korean relations, see “North Korea in U.S.-ROK Relations” below.) 
THAAD Deployment  
North Korea’s provocations appear to have driven the U.S.-South Korea military alliance closer. 
In addition to staging larger joint military exercises together, in July 2016, Seoul and Washington 
announced plans to deploy the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) system in South Korea. This decision, debated for months in Seoul, both 
acknowledged North Korea’s growing capabilities and indicated South Korea’s willingness to 
rebuff China. China and Russia both criticized the decision harshly, claiming that the system’s 
reach extended beyond the Korean peninsula and would “erode the security of the region.”15 
China went further, threatening retaliatory moves such as reducing tourism and denying visas, 
moves that could further alienate the South Korean public.16 Earlier in her presidency, Park had 
cultivated a stronger strategic relationship with China partly in order to influence Beijing’s North 
Korea policy. But with Chinese pressure failing to curb Pyongyang’s provocations, South Korea 
appeared to tilt toward U.S. wishes in joining its missile defense system. Seoul’s willingness to 
withstand Beijing’s harsh response may represent a new degree of strategic trust with the United 
States. (For more, see “Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance” below.) 
                                                 
11 State Department, “Remarks With Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se at a Press Availability,” 
October 19, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/10/263333.htm.  
12 JH Ahn, “UN Calls for Increased Support for Victims of N.Korean Typhoon,” NKNews, September 21, 2016. 
13 In 2008, Congress reauthorized the North Korean Human Rights Act through 2012 under P.L. 110-346. In August 
2012, Congress approved the extension of the act (P.L. 112-172) through 2017. 
14 Kent Boydston, “The ROK North Korea Human Rights Act,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog, March 
14, 2016. 
15 Speech by Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, China’s Central Military Commission, “The 
Challenges of Conflict Resolution,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue 2016, 
Fourth Plenary Session, June 5, 2016, available at https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/
shangri-la-dialogue-2016-4a4b/plenary4-6c15/jianguo-6391. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: 
Relations in Kim Jong Un’s Era,” Comparative Connections, September 2016. 
16 Scott Snyder, “China’s Limited Retaliation Options Against the THAAD Deployment in South Korea,” Council on 
Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog, August 8, 2016.  
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The decision to deploy THAAD was met with a degree of controversy in South Korea. When the 
Park administration announced that the THAAD battery would be positioned in Seongju, North 
Gyeongsang Province, local residents protested. Among their concerns were health issues 
associated with THAAD’s X-band radar.17 A September 12th meeting between President Park and 
the heads of South Korea’s two main opposition parties failed to produce a consensus on 
THAAD, with the opposition parties suggesting that the National Assembly should have an 
opportunity to vote on the deployment. In late September, the Ministry of National Defense 
announced that a nearby golf course, in a more remote and mountainous location, had been 
selected as the new site for the THAAD battery.18 
South Korea Nuclear Armament Debate  
In the wake of North Korea’s fifth nuclear weapon test and multiple missile launches, South 
Korea has rekindled a debate about developing its own nuclear weapons capability, 
notwithstanding Seoul’s reliance on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.”19 Some analysts have argued 
that North Korea’s advancing capability undermines U.S. protection because of Pyongyang’s 
growing credibility that it could launch a second nuclear strike.20 In one 2016 Asan Institute poll, 
65% of respondents indicated they favor nuclearization, while 31% opposed. This is the highest 
level of support since the Asan Institute began asking this question in 2010. Debates about 
nuclearization have become more prominent in political circles in Seoul following the 2016 
tests.21 Following North Korea’s September nuclear test, a group of National Assembly members 
from President Park’s ruling Saenuri Party called on the ROK government to consider developing 
nuclear weapons.22 One of the potential candidates in the 2017 South Korean presidential 
campaign, the governor of Gyeonggi Province, also has supported nuclear armament.23 A 
Presidential advisory group, the National Unification Advisory Council, in an October report 
recommended that South Korea consider a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South 
Korea.24 Those weapons were removed in 1991, and U.S. nuclear weapons are deliverable on 
long-range bombers as well as B-52s from nearby Guam.25 The Korean government is also 
considering a proposal to develop a nuclear-powered attack submarine and rallying support for 
THAAD deployment.26 In the past, President Park has rejected the notion of South Korea 
                                                 
17 Go Myong Hyun. “Implementing Sanctions against North Korea: A South Korean Perspective,” The Asan Institute 
for Policy Studies, August 3, 2016, at http://www.theasanforum.org/implementing-sanctions-against-north-
korea%EF%BC%9Aa-south-korean-perspective/#4. 
18 Kim Gamel and Yoo Kyong Chang. “THAAD's New Home Will Be Golf Course in South Korean Mountains,” Stars 
and Stripes, September 30, 2016, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/thaad-s-new-home-will-be-golf-course-in-
south-korean-mountains-1.431721.  
19 Anna Fifield, “As North Korea Flexes Its Muscles, Some in South Want Nukes, Too,” Washington Post, March 20, 
2016. The Gerald Ford Administration discovered President Park Chung Hee’s clandestine nuclear weapons program in 
the 1970s, and the United States successfully pressured South Korea to shut it down. For more on this episode, see 
Donald Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, Basic Books, pp. 69-73. 
20 Lee Byong-Chul, “Preventing a Nuclear South Korea,” 38 North, September 16, 2016.  
21 Aidan Foster-Carter. “South Korea-North Korea Relations: A Toxic Nuclear Tocsin,” Comparative Connections 
CSIS Pacific Forum, September 2016.  
22 “Calls Grow for South Korea to Consider Deploying Nuclear Weapons,” DW, September 9, 2013.  
23 “Man Poised for South Korean Presidency Wants a Nuclear Arms Race,” Daily Caller, October 3, 2016.  
24 Kang Seung-woo, “Park Asked to Consider US Nukes: Presidential Panel Supports Presence of Tactical Weapons,” 
Korea Times, October 13, 2016. 
25 David E. Rosenbaum, “U.S. to Pull A-Bombs From South Korea,” New York Times, October 20, 1991. 
26 Jun Ji-hye, “Can S. Korea Get US Approval for Nuclear Sub?” Korea Times, October 18, 2016. 
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developing nuclear weapon, saying that “nuclear weapons should not exist on the Korean 
Peninsula.”27 
U.S. policymakers have reiterated their “ironclad commitment” to defend South Korea and flew 
two B-1B long-range nuclear-capable bombers over the Korean Peninsula as a show of force and 
reassurance following the 2016 nuclear tests. However, some South Koreans have pointed to the 
failure of the United States and others to stanch Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capability as 
justification for Seoul to pursue its own nuclear arsenal. Presidential candidate Donald Trump in 
spring 2016 stated that he was open to South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal to counter 
the North Korean nuclear threat.28 Others argue that the U.S. military alliance with South Korea is 
an effective deterrent. 
Analysts point to the potentially negative consequences for South Korea if it were to develop its 
own nuclear weapons, including significant costs; reduced international standing in the campaign 
to denuclearize North Korea; the possible imposition of economic sanctions that would be 
triggered by leaving the global non-proliferation regime; and potentially encouraging Japan to 
develop nuclear weapons capability. For the United States, South Korea developing nuclear 
weapons could mean diminished U.S. influence in Asia, the unraveling of the U.S. alliance 
system, and the possibility of creating a destabilizing nuclear arms race in Asia.29  
To reassure South Korea after North Korea’s tests, United States officials have reaffirmed the 
U.S. security guarantee, including extended deterrence under the United States’ so-called “nuclear 
umbrella.” An October 2016 joint “2+2” statement issued by U.S. and South Korean Foreign and 
Defense Ministers re-stated the U.S. position that “any use of nuclear weapons [by North Korea] 
will be met with an effective and overwhelming response.” At the 2+2 meeting, the two sides 
agreed to establish a new, Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).30 
(For more, see “Deterrence Issues” below.) 
South Korea Announces Retaliation Plan 
An additional, related concern for some U.S. officials and analysts is the possibility that a small-
scale North Korean provocation against South Korea is more likely to escalate than it was 
previously, due in part to South Korea’s stated intention to respond more forcefully to an attack. 
Shortly after North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test, South Korean Defense Minister Han 
Min-koo announced a “Korean Massive Punishment & Retaliation” plan to strike Pyongyang and 
                                                 
27 During a January 2016 news conference, President Park said, “I completely understand an assertion that we, too, 
should possess a tactical nuclear [weapon].... However, that would be the breaching of promises with the international 
community because we have so far consistently insisted upon the promises with the international community. 
Meanwhile, I do not believe that there must be a nuclear [weapon] on this side of the Korean Peninsula, because we are 
provided with the US nuclear umbrella under the ROK-US mutual defense treaty and because the ROK and the United 
States have been jointly responding to this in line with the tailored ROK-US deterrent strategy since October 2013.” 
“ROK TV: President Park Discusses Measures for DPRK Nuclear Program in 13 January News Conference,” Seoul 
KBS 1 TV in Korean January 13, 2016, translated by the Open Source Center, KPR2016011309975241. 
28 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” New York Times, March 26, 2016, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?_r=1; “Full Rush Transcript: Donald 
Trump, CNN Milwaukee Republican Presidential Town Hall,” CNN, March 29, 2016, available at 
cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com. 
29 See, for example, Robert Manning, “Trump's ‘Sopranos' Worldview Would Undo Asian Alliances,” New Atlanticist 
blog post, March 29, 2016; and Troy Stangarone, “Going Nuclear Wouldn’t Be Easy for South Korea,” The National 
Interest. February 29, 2016.  
30 State Department, “Joint Statement of the 2016 United States - Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers' 
Meeting,” October 19, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263340.htm. 
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top North Korean leadership in the case of an imminent attack.31 U.S. defense officials insist that 
the close day-to-day coordination in the alliance ensures that U.S.-ROK communication would be 
strong in the event of a new contingency. (For more, see “Deterrence Issues” below.) 
Expanding U.S.-South Korea-Japan Cooperation  
U.S. officials have been frustrated by the lack of relatively robust cooperation between Japan and 
South Korea. Despite the two countries’ similar levels of development, geographical proximity, 
and shared security concerns, relations between the two nations have remained tense, particularly 
over sensitive historical disputes related to Imperial Japan’s aggression during the first half of the 
20th century, when Imperial Japan ruled the Korean Peninsula. The Obama Administration has 
invested considerable effort in managing relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and in recent years 
Members have introduced and Congress has passed a number of bills and resolutions that include 
language encouraging greater trilateral cooperation.32 A poor relationship between Seoul and 
Tokyo jeopardizes several important U.S. interests, including trilateral cooperation over North 
Korea policy and the ability to respond effectively to China. The ongoing opportunity costs to the 
United States have led some policy analysts to call for the United States to become more directly 
involved in trying to improve relations between South Korea and Japan.33  
Provocative actions by North Korea often are followed by bursts of U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
cooperation, and in 2016 the three countries appear to have closely coordinated their responses to 
North Korea’s 2016 nuclear tests and missile launches. President Park attended the March 31-
April 1 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. On the sidelines of the multilateral Nuclear 
Security Summit in Washington, DC, in March and April 2016, Park held bilateral meetings with 
President Obama, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, among 
others. She also joined a trilateral meeting with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe, their 
first trilateral summit since 2014. The three leaders agreed to strengthen trilateral cooperation on 
North Korea policy at all levels of government, focusing on three goals: (1) ensuring the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; (2) restoring “a sense of stability and peace” to the 
region; and (3) shining a spotlight on human rights conditions in North Korea. The three also 
discussed joint cooperation in other fields, including terrorism, the Middle East, climate change, 
and the Obama Administration’s “moonshot” cancer research initiative.34  
Since the trilateral summit, trilateral cooperation has increased. In June 2016, U.S., South Korean, 
and Japanese Aegis ships shared intelligence in a training exercise that focused on tracking 
potential North Korean missile launches. Underscoring the sensitivity of military cooperation, 
however, the exercises did not involve intercepting the missiles, and South Korean officials noted 
that it was “not a strategic exercise” and had “nothing to do with any country’s missile defense 
                                                 
31 Hong Dam-young, “S. Korea Has Plan to Assassinate Kim Jong-un,' Says Defense Minister,” Korea Times, 
September 22, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/205_214524.html.  
32 See, for instance, H.Res. 634, “Recognizing the Importance of the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan Trilateral 
Relationship,” which was introduced on March 2, 2016, and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On 
September 27, 2016, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a hearing entitled “The 
U.S.–Republic of Korea–Japan Trilateral Relationship: Promoting Mutual Interests in Asia.”  
33 See, for instance, Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash East Asian Security and 
the United States (New York: Columbia University Press), May 2015. 
34 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama, President Park Geun-Hye of the Republic of Korea, and Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan After Trilateral Meeting,” Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, 
March 31, 2016. 
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program.”35 North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test prompted new trilateral initiatives: at the 
United Nations, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo together have pushed for more stringent sanctions 
on North Korea and convened trilateral meetings at the foreign minister level. Thus far, however, 
South Korea and Japan have not signed defense cooperation agreements, primarily due to Seoul’s 
hesitancy. The agreements include a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA), which the United States has welcomed because it could institutionalize trilateral 
defense cooperation. The two countries first negotiated a GSOMIA in 2012, only to have Seoul 
withdraw from the agreement at the last minute due to domestic opposition. (For more, see the 
“South Korea’s Regional Relations” section below.) 
South Korea-Japan Relations Improve 
South Korea’s relations with Japan have been strained since 2012 but have improved steadily, 
albeit tenuously, since early 2015. This rapprochement is due in large measure to Prime Minister 
Abe’s avoidance of flagrantly inflammatory actions or statements on historical issues, the strength 
of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and Park’s decision to relax the firm linkage between the Japanese 
government’s treatment of historical issues and Seoul’s willingness to participate in most forms of 
high-level bilateral activities.36 In November 2015, Park and Abe held their first bilateral summit 
meeting, in Seoul, since Park entered office in 2013. A Park-Abe summit in September 2016, the 
third in less than a year, occurred in a “positive mood,” according to the Blue House (the 
residence and office of South Korea’s president). The discussions were dominated by 
consultations over “the need for Korea, the United States and Japan to work more closely together 
to strongly and efficiently respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, including 
the possibility of additional hostilities.”37 
A key to the improvement in bilateral relations, as well as in trilateral cooperation, was a 
December 2015 South Korea agreement over one of their most contentious bilateral issues: how 
Japan should address South Korean concerns regarding “comfort women” who were forced to 
provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers during the 1930s and 1940s, when Korea was under 
Japanese rule.38 The agreement included a new apology from Abe and the provision of 1 billion 
yen (about $8.3 million) from the Japanese government to a new Korean foundation that supports 
surviving victims.39 The two Foreign Ministers agreed that this long-standing bilateral rift would 
be “finally and irreversibly resolved” pending the Japanese government’s implementation of the 
agreement.40 Additionally, the Japanese Foreign Minister stated that the Imperial Japanese 
military authorities were involved in the comfort women’s situation, and that the current Japanese 
government is “painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.”41 U.S. officials hailed 
                                                 
35 “South Korea, Japan to Hold Missile Defense Drill in June,” The Diplomat. May 23, 2016.  
36 Alastair Gale, “South Korea’s Park Chides Abe but Seeks Stable Japan Ties,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2015. 
37 The Blue House, “Korea-Japan Summit Held on Sidelines of ASEAN-related Summits,” September 7, 2016, 
available at english1.president.go.kr.  
38 No text of the agreement was released, perhaps indicating the delicate nature of the issue. Instead, the agreement was 
announced in a joint public appearance in Seoul by South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and Japanese 
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. For the South Korean Foreign Ministry’s translation of the joint appearance, see 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/image/common/title/res/Remarks%20at%20the%20Joint%20Press%20Availability_1.pdf. 
For the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s translation, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.  
39 In contrast to past apologies from Japanese Prime Ministers that were made in their personal capacities, Kishida 
stated that Abe’s apology was issued in his capacity “as Prime Minister of Japan.”  
40 South Korean and Japanese Foreign Ministries’ translations of the December 28, 2015, joint announcement. 
41 The full quote from the Japanese translation is “The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese 
military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, and the 
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the December 2015 ROK-Japan agreement as a breakthrough, and observers report that U.S. 
officials played a role in encouraging the agreement.42  
Despite strong criticism of the agreement in South Korea, implementation of the deal has 
proceeded. In July 2016, the South Korean government officially established the Foundation for 
Reconciliation and Healing; in August, Japan provided the promised 1 billion yen to the 
foundation. Some surviving comfort women have refused payments and insist that the Japanese 
government take legal responsibility for the wartime system, and South Korean opposition parties 
have strongly criticized the deal. Many Japanese conservatives continue to express displeasure 
about a comfort woman statue that stands in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. In the 
December 2015 agreement the Park government promised to “make efforts to appropriately 
address” Japan’s concerns, a phrase many Japanese interpreted as an understanding that South 
Korea would move the statue to a different location.43 Any attempt to move the statue is expected 
to trigger passionate, perhaps large-scale, protests in South Korea. Nevertheless, many analysts 
observe that President Park appears committed to upholding Seoul’s end of the deal, at least 
through her presidency, which will end in December 2017. Her strategy appears to be to use the 
foundation to initiate programs to assist the surviving comfort women, a sizeable percentage of 
whom may then publicly support the December 2015 agreement. 
South Korea-China Relations Show Strains 
Beyond their impact on inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s 2016 nuclear tests and missile 
launches may have set in motion a shift in Northeast Asia’s geopolitical dynamics. Park spent her 
first three years in office cultivating good relations with China. She held six summit meetings 
with Chinese President Xi Jinping before her first with Prime Minister Abe, in November 2015.  
In the weeks following North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear weapon test, however, South Korea’s 
ties with China frayed, and domestic critics charged that Park’s outreach to China failed its first 
major test. Whereas Park spoke with Obama and Abe within hours after North Korea’s January 6 
test, according to reports, her first phone conversation with Xi appears not to have occurred until 
February 5, despite her requests to speak.44 In the days after the nuclear test, China reportedly 
declined to respond to South Korean requests to use the new ROK-China military hotline that was 
created in late December 2015.45 In her public remarks in the weeks following January 6, Park 
emphasized trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation more than South Korea-China 
cooperation and has called on China to do more.46 China’s public portrayal of the THAAD 
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Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.” The Korean translation reads “The 
issue of ‘comfort women’ was a matter which, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, severely 
injured the honor and dignity of many women. In this regard, the Government of Japan painfully acknowledges its 
responsibility.” Kishida’s statement appears significant because some Japanese conservatives have said that the 
Imperial Japanese military did not directly recruit the comfort women and have used this argument to downplay or 
deny the military’s role in administering the comfort-women system. 
42 Daniel Sneider, “Behind the Comfort Women Agreement,” Toyo Keizai Online, January 10, 2016. 
43 The Japanese translation of the December 28, 2015, joint statement says that the Park government will “strive to 
solve this [statue] issue in an appropriate manner.” 
44 Lee Seong-hyon, “Why Xi Jinping Didn't Answer Park’s Call?” Korea Times, February 5, 2016. “Chinese, South 
Korean Presidents Talk Relations on Phone,” Xinhua, February 6, 2016. 
45 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea Provocation Puts China, South Korea Ties to the Test,” UPI, January 8, 2016. 
46 For instance, in a press conference the week after North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test, Park said “I expect China 
to play a more active role than it does now.... ” “ROK TV: President Park Discusses Measures for DPRK Nuclear 
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system, rather than North Korea’s actions, as undermining regional stability has angered many 
South Korean officials. 
In contrast to its positive portrayal of Park’s meeting with Abe in September 2016, the Blue 
House described her meeting with Xi that same month as occurring in “a serious atmosphere.” 
The two leaders reportedly agreed to “continue communication” over North Korea’s nuclear 
nukes, but disagreed over the necessity for deploying the THAAD system in South Korea. 
Additionally, although the two leaders both expressed opposition to North Korea’s nuclear 
program, Park stressed the need for “a strong and stern” international response to North Korea’s 
nuclear development. In contrast, Xi called for a return to the Six-Party Talks and the need to 
“deal with concerns of all parties in a comprehensive and balanced way.”47  
In fall 2015, the South Korean Defense Minister and Foreign Minister made the first public 
comments by Cabinet officials that were seen to be critical of China’s actions in the South China 
Sea. South Korean government officials generally appear reluctant to raise objections in public 
about Chinese behavior. U.S. officials, including President Obama, have called on South Korea to 
be more vocal about China’s series of assertive actions in the South China Sea.48  
Competing claims to fishing rights have also caused diplomatic tensions between Seoul and 
Beijing. In 2016, the number of Chinese fishing vessels operating in waters claimed by the two 
Koreas, as well as in South Korea’s undisputed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), reportedly 
increased dramatically from dozens of vessels to hundreds. South Korean fishermen blame a 
precipitous drop in South Korea’s 2016 crab catch on the increase, and argue that the Chinese 
fishing boats use non-sustainable methods that damage spawning grounds.49 Moreover, by 
prompting increased patrols in the area by both Koreas, the expanded presence of Chinese fishing 
vessels increases the chances of an unintended collision or skirmish between South Korean and 
North Korean coast guard or naval vessels attempting to police the area, particularly around the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) that South Korea says is the maritime boundary between the two 
Koreas. According to one 2016 report, North Korea had sold fishing rights to Chinese fisherman 
to raise foreign currency.50 In June 2016, the United Nations Command (UNC)—which operates 
under a U.S. commander—announced that it would conduct joint patrols with South Korea to 
enforce the 1953 armistice’s restrictions on illegal fishing in the Han River Estuary. Reportedly 
this was the first time the UNC and South Korea had conducted joint operations in the area.51 
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Program in 13 January News Conference.” Seoul KBS 1 TV in Korean, January 13, 2016. Translation provided by the 
Open Source Center, KPR2016011309975241. In her February 16 speech to the National Assembly, Park said “In the 
process [of using tougher measures to pressure North Korea to denuclearize], solidarity with our ally the United States, 
as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan, will be enhanced. We will also continue to attach 
importance to working together with China and Russia.” 
47 The Blue House, “Korea-China Summit Stresses Importance of Continued Strategic Communication over North 
Korean Nuclear Issue,” September 5, 2016, available at english1.president.go.kr; and Chinese Foreign Ministry, “ 
Xi Jinping Meets with President Park Geun-hye of the ROK,” September 5, 2016, available at fmprc.gov.cn. 
48 For more on maritime disputes in the South China Sea, see CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the 
South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, by Ben Dolven et al.; CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial 
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan; and CRS Report 
R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by 
Ronald O'Rourke. 
49 John G. Grisafi, “UN Command Polices Chinese Boats in Han River Estuary,” nknews.org, June 11, 2016. 
50 JH Ahn, “North Korea Sold Fishing Rights to China for $30 Million, Lawmaker Claims,” nknews.org, July 1, 2016. 
51 Grisafi, “UN Command Polices Chinese Boats in Han River Estuary.” The 1953 armistice among the combatants in 
the Korean War brought an official end to hostilities in that conflict. 
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Clashes—including collisions and violence—between South Korean coast guard vessels and 
Chinese fishing boats appear to have increased over the course of 2016, creating bilateral friction. 
(For more, see the “South Korea’s Regional Relations” section below.) 
South Korea and the TPP52  
South Korea has expressed increasing interest in joining the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Free Trade Agreement, which was signed on February 4, 2016.53 Presumably, South Korea 
would not be able to join the TPP until after the agreement is ratified by the current parties.54 The 
Obama Administration has welcomed South Korea’s interest. Nonetheless, concerns from the 
U.S. business community over South Korea’s implementation of certain aspects of the KORUS 
FTA—in effect since March 15, 2012—could be sticking points in South Korea’s potential bid to 
join the TPP. The chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch, recently 
raised these issues in a letter to the South Korean Ambassador, highlighting that “adherence to 
existing international trade and investment agreements” is a key factor in U.S. consideration of 
new trade negotiations.55 The perceived economic impact of KORUS also may be a focus of U.S. 
debate over South Korea’s potential participation in TPP. While some herald KORUS as an 
economic success, citing increased exports of some U.S. products, including autos and services,56 
other U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns over the increased U.S. trade deficit with South 
Korea since KORUS went into effect.57 (For more, see the “Economic Relations” section below.) 
Hanjin Shipping Bankruptcy 
On August 31, 2016, Hanjin Shipping Company filed for bankruptcy protection in South Korea. 
Hanjin is the world’s seventh largest shipping company, the largest in South Korea, and an 
offshoot of a famous Korean chaebol conglomerate. The company’s woes follow a general 
decline in profitability among shipping companies as a major increase in capacity, 240% over the 
past decade, combined with slow growth in demand has led to a fall in shipping prices.58 Weak 
demand reflects a broader trend of slow growth in international trade, predicted by the WTO to 
grow by just 1.7% in 2016, below estimates for global GDP growth.59 Highlighting the 
susceptibility of global supply chains to disruptions across the globe, Hanjin’s bankruptcy had an 
                                                 
52 For more on the proposed TPP, see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and 
Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams. 
53 The TPP negotiating parties are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
54 In order to become effective, the agreement must be ratified in all 12 countries, following requisite domestic legal 
procedures. In the United States this would require implementing legislation. Congressional leaders in both the House 
and Senate have suggested it is unlikely that TPP legislation will be considered before the November elections. “TPP 
Ratification Still a Rocky Road in Japan, US,” Nikkei Asian Review, March 9, 2016. 
55 Letter from Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, to Honorable Ahn Ho-Young, 
Ambassador to the United States of the Republic of Korea, March 2, 2016. 
56 James W. Fatheree, The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement at Three, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, March 13, 2015, 
https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/the-us-korea-free-trade-agreement-three. 
57 Robert E. Scott, U.S.-Korea Trade Deal Resulted in Growing Trade Deficits and More than 75,000 Lost Jobs, 
Economic Policy Institute, March 30, 2015, http://www.epi.org/blog/u-s-korea-trade-deal-resulted-in-growing-trade-
deficits-and-more-than-75000-lost-u-s-jobs/. 
58 Vikram Mansharamani, “This South Korean Shipping Company's Collapse Could Affect You,” PBS Newshour, 
October 6, 2016. 
59 WTO, “Trade in 2016 to Grow at Slowest Pace Since the Financial Crisis,” press release, September 27, 2016, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres16_e/pr779_e.htm. 
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immediate impact on international trade flows. Hanjin ships loaded with cargo were kept offshore 
for several weeks due to concerns both from port authorities over payment and from Hanjin over 
potential seizure of their assets overseas. 
The demise of the shipping firm could have longer term implications, if it represents a shift in 
attitude between the South Korean government and its national champions. The state-run Korean 
Development Bank (KDB) cut off funding to the shipper in July, spurring the bankruptcy. KDB 
has since agreed to provide limited financing to Hanjin, but only to help unload current cargo.60 
With analysts predicting tens of thousands of potential job losses in the port of Busan if the 
company goes under, many were surprised by the government’s withdrawal of support.61 Some 
observers see it as a positive sign that the Korean government is letting the market determine the 
fate of a major company, sending a signal to other chaebol not to take state support for granted.62 
President Park reinforced this message in comments to her cabinet, commenting that corporate 
irresponsibility and moral hazard (i.e., expectations of support that lead to risky behavior) have 
been damaging to the Korean economy.63 
Park Geun-hye’s Party Loses Control of Legislature 
In a development that stunned most political observers, in national legislative elections on April 
13, 2016, President Park’s conservative Saenuri Party (New Frontier Party, NFP) not only lost its 
majority in South Korea’s 300-seat National Assembly but also its status as South Korea’s largest 
party. The progressive Minjoo (Democratic) Party of Korea won 123 seats, to the NFP’s 122.64 
The People’s Party—which was formed in early 2016 among former Minjoo Party members led 
by entrepreneur and onetime presidential candidate Ahn Cheol-soo—won 38 seats, potentially 
placing it in a position to play a decisive role in the unicameral National Assembly. (See Figure 
1.) 
Domestic economic issues appeared to have been high in voters’ minds, perhaps fueled by 
stagnating growth rates and concerns about increasing income inequality, as well as rising 
unemployment and underemployment of recent college graduates. Opinion polls, political 
observers, and many South Korean politicians also attributed the election results to Park’s 
“arrogant” leadership style, in-fighting in the NFP, Park’s alleged mismanagement of domestic 
crises, and her inability to push her domestic economic agenda through the National Assembly. In 
the days following the election, Park’s public approval ratings fell to roughly 30%, near the 
lowest levels of her presidency. 
It is unclear what the victory of South Korea’s progressive parties will mean for South Korean 
policy. The president and the central bureaucracy are the dominant forces in the South Korean 
polity, particularly over foreign policy, but the Assembly can influence the political atmosphere 
surrounding the president’s policies and personnel appointments. Its stance also can be decisive 
on many domestic issues. The absence of any majority party seems likely to continue the 
legislative gridlock that has stalled most of Park’s domestic initiatives in the National Assembly’s 
                                                 
60 In-Soo Nam, “Hanjin Shipping Shares Soar After Funding Offers,” Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2016. 
61 Heejin Kim, “Hanjin Brings One of the World's Busiest Shipping Terminals Clost to Standstill,” Bloomberg News, 
September 13, 2016. 
62 Evan Ramstad, The Collapse of Hanjin Shipping is Leading South Korea to Rethink Two Economic Ideas, CSIS, 
September 28, 2016, https://www.csis.org/node/38291. 
63 Chris Dupin, “President of South Korea Criticizes Hanjin's ‘Complacent Mindset',” American Shipper, September 
14, 2016. 
64 Prior to the election, the Saenuri Party held 157 seats. The Minjoo Party held 109.  
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2012-2016 term, a period when Park’s NFP controlled the legislature. The Minjoo Party and/or 
People’s Party reportedly advocate positions that could pose challenges for the Obama 
Administration's Korea policy, such as adopting a more conciliatory approach to North Korea 
(including re-opening the KIC), criticizing the 2015 South Korea-Japan “comfort women” 
agreement, and opposing deployment of a THAAD system in South Korea. The elections 
weakened most of the Saenuri Party’s leading contenders for the December 2017 presidential 
election (in which President Park cannot run due to term limits), while simultaneously boosting 
the Minjoo Party and People’s Party’s prospects.  
Figure 1. Results of South Korea's April 2016 National Assembly Elections 
As of April 22, 2016 
 
Source: Asan Korea Perspective, vol. 1, no. 8, April 11-22, 2016. 
Notes: National Assembly elections are held every four years. The April 2016 elections were for 
representatives to participate in the National Assembly’s next session, which is scheduled to begin in June 2016. 
President Park Geun-hye is from the Saenuri (New Frontier) Party. South Korea’s next presidential election is 
scheduled for December 2017. By law, South Korean presidents are limited to one five-year term. 
 
Background on U.S.-South Korea Relations 
Overview 
While the U.S.-South Korea relationship is highly complex and multifaceted, five factors 
arguably drive the scope and state of relations between the two allies, as well as congressional 
interest in U.S.-South Korea relations: 
 the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass 
destruction programs and perceptions in Washington and Seoul of whether the 
Kim Jong-un regime poses a threat, through its belligerence and/or the risk of its 
collapse; 
 China’s rising influence in Northeast Asia, which has become an increasingly 
integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic and 
economic policymaking; 
 South Korea’s transformation into one of the world’s leading economies—with a 
strong export-oriented industrial base—which has led to an expansion in the 
number and types of trade disputes and helped drive the two countries’ decision 
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to sign the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which 
Congress approved in 2011;  
 South Korea’s continued democratization, which has raised the importance of 
public opinion in Seoul’s foreign policy; and 
 the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country’s middle-power 
status to play a larger regional and, more recently, global role.  
Additionally, while people-to-people ties generally do not directly affect matters of “high” 
politics in bilateral relations, the presence of over 1.8 million Korean Americans and the hundreds 
of thousands of trips taken annually between the two nations has helped cement the two countries 
together. South Korean President Park Geun-hye and her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, spoke 
before joint meetings of Congress, in May 2013 and October 2011, respectively. Six South 
Korean presidents have addressed joint meetings of Congress since the ROK’s founding in 
1948.65 
Large majorities of South Koreans say they value the U.S.-ROK alliance and have positive 
opinions of the United States.66 Since at least 2014, South Koreans have consistently indicated 
that the United States is their favorite nation, according to one opinion poll.67 However, many 
South Koreans are resentful of U.S. influence and chafe when they feel their leaders offer too 
many concessions to the United States. Many South Korean officials also tend to be wary of 
being drawn into U.S. policies that they perceive as possibly antagonizing China, and are much 
more suspicious of Japan’s actions in East Asia than are most U.S. policymakers. Although many 
of these concerns are widely held in South Korea, they are particularly articulated by Korea’s 
progressive groups, who have opposed much of current President Park’s agenda, including the 
relatively hard line she has taken against North Korea.  
 
                                                 
65 The other addresses to joint meetings of Congress by South Korean presidents have been as follows: Rhee Syngman, 
July 28, 1954; Roh Tae Woo, October 18, 1989; Kim Young Sam, July 26, 1995; and Kim Dae Jung, June 10, 1998. 
Neither South Korean who was president during South Korea’s period of military rule, Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) 
nor Chun Doo Hwan (1979-1988), received the honor of addressing a joint meeting of Congress. Neither did Roh Moo-
hyun (2003-2008). South Korea-U.S. tensions spiked during Roh’s presidency. 
66 In a 2014 Pew Research Center survey, over 80% of South Koreans registered a “favorable” opinion of the United 
States, compared to less than 50% in 2003. Pew Research Center, “Global Indicators Database,” accessed March 3, 
2015, and available at http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/. South Korea recorded the fourth-highest 
opinions of the United States. 
67 Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2016,” May 3, 2016, at http://en.asaninst.org/
contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2016/.  
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Figure 2. Map of the Korean Peninsula 
 
Sources: Map produced by CRS using data from ESRI, and the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the 
Geographer. 
Notes: The “Cheonan Sinking” refers to the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, 
killing over 40 ROK sailors. A multinational investigation led by South Korea determined that the vessel was 
sunk by a North Korean submarine. Yeonpyeong Island was attacked in November 2010 by North Korean 
artillery, which killed four South Koreans (two marines and two civilians) and wounded dozens.  
* This map reflects geographic place name policies set forth by the United States Board on Geographic Names 
pursuant to P.L. 80-242. In applying these policies to the case of the sea separating the Korean Peninsula and the 
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Japanese Archipelago, the board has determined that the “Sea of Japan” is the appropriate standard name for use 
in U.S. government publications. The Republic of Korea refers to this body of water as the “East Sea.” It refers 
to the “Yellow Sea” as the “West Sea.” 
Historical Background 
The United States and South Korea have been allies since the United States intervened on the 
Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 
33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year conflict. On 
October 1, 1953, a little more than two months after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice 
agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which provides 
that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will act to meet the common 
danger. The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK to supplement the 650,000-
strong South Korean armed forces. South Korea deployed troops to support the U.S.-led military 
campaign in Vietnam. South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S. deployments in other conflicts, 
most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play a non-combat role in Iraq and over 300 non-
combat troops to Afghanistan. 
Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth propelled South Korea into the ranks of the 
world’s largest industrialized countries. For nearly two decades, South Korea has been one of the 
United States’ largest trading partners. Economic growth, coupled with South Korea’s 
transformation in the late 1980s from a dictatorship to a democracy, also has helped transform the 
ROK into a mid-level regional power that can influence U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, 
particularly the United States’ approach toward North Korea. 
North Korea in U.S.-ROK Relations 
North Korea Policy Coordination 
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean 
relationship. South Korea’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military power has given Seoul a 
much more direct and prominent role in Washington’s planning and thinking about how to deal 
with Pyongyang. One possible indicator of South Korea’s centrality to diplomacy over North 
Korea is that no successful round of the Six-Party nuclear talks has taken place when inter-
Korean relations have been poor.68 Since 2009, the United States and South Korea in effect have 
adopted a joint approach to Pyongyang that has four main components: 
 keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program but 
refusing to restart them without a North Korean assurance that it would take 
“irreversible steps” to denuclearize; 
 insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded 
by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in North-
South Korean relations; 
 gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; and 
 responding to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions against North 
Korean entities and conducting a series of military exercises. 
                                                 
68 The Six-Party talks were held among China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States 
between 2003 and 2008. 
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The two countries’ approach appears to focus on containing, rather than rolling back, North 
Korea’s nuclear activities by gradually increasing international pressure against North Korea. One 
drawback is that it has allowed Pyongyang to control the day-to-day situation, according to some 
experts. While Washington and Seoul wait to react to Pyongyang’s moves, the criticism runs, 
North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs and has embarked on a 
propaganda offensive designed to shape the eventual negotiating agenda to its benefit. Prior to 
2016, when Park hardened her approach in response to North Korea’s January nuclear test and 
February satellite launch, many of her proposed initiatives with North Korea appeared to be 
designed to rectify these perceived shortcomings. To date, however, North Korea’s general refusal 
to accept Park’s overtures has not provided her government with an opportunity to apply her 
policies. 
The joint U.S.-ROK approach has involved elements of both engagement and pressure. 
Washington and Seoul have tended to reach out to North Korea during relatively quiescent 
periods. In contrast, they have tended to emphasize pressure tactics during times of increased 
tension with North Korea. These periods of tension occurred repeatedly after Lee Myung-bak’s 
inauguration in February 2008. Most notably, they included: 
 North Korean nuclear tests in May 2009, February 2013, and January 2016;  
 North Korean long-range rocket launches in April 2009, April 2012, December 
2012, and February 2016;  
 the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan; the 
November 2010 North Korean artillery attack on the South Korean island of 
Yeonpyeong-do; and an August 2015 landmine explosion—blamed on North 
Korea—on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ).69  
The shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was North Korea’s first direct artillery attack on ROK 
territory since the 1950-1953 Korean War and served to harden South Korean attitudes toward 
North Korea. President Lee reportedly stated that he wanted to order a retaliatory air strike, but 
the existing rules of engagement—which he subsequently relaxed—and the existence of the U.S.-
ROK military alliance restrained him.70 After North Korea’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island, many 
conservative Koreans criticized as insufficient the Lee government’s military response, which 
primarily consisted of launching about 80 shells at North Korea and holding large-scale exercises 
with the United States. Park Geun-hye has made boosting deterrence against North Korea a tenet 
of her presidency, and has vowed to retaliate if North Korea launches another conventional 
attack.71 
                                                 
69 On Yeonpyeong Island, over 150 shells fired by North Korea killed four South Koreans (two Marines and two 
civilians), wounded dozens, and destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings. All 46 South Korean 
sailors on the Cheonan died. A multinational team that investigated the sinking, led by South Korea, determined that 
the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. The cause of the Cheonan’s sinking has become highly controversial 
in South Korea. While most conservatives believe that North Korea was responsible for explosion, many who lean to 
the left have criticized the investigation team as biased or argue that its methodology was flawed. As for the 2015 
landmine explosion, an investigation by the United Nations Command, which is commanded by a U.S. officer who 
concurrently serves as commander of U.S. forces in Korea, found that the mines had been placed recently by North 
Korean infiltrators, in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement among the parties to the Korean War. United States 
Forces Korea, “United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission Investigates Land Mine Detonation in 
Demilitarized Zone,” August 10, 2015, http://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/tabid/12660/Article/613533/united-nations-
command-military-armistice-commission-investigates-land-mine-det.aspx. 
70 “Lee Recalls Getting Tough with N. Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2013. 
71 “Park Vows to Make N. Korea ‘Pay’ If It Attacks S. Korea,” Korea Herald, May 7, 2013.  
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Inter-Korean Relations and Park Geun-Hye’s “Trustpolitik” 
Relations between the two Koreas have been poor since 2010, when two military attacks by North 
Korea resulted in South Korea’s halting nearly all regular inter-Korean interchange.72 From 2011 
to 2015, although inter-Korean relations were tense, they remained stable, and President Park 
spent the first three years of her presidency proposing a number of inter-Korean projects, 
exchanges, and dialogues in order to build trust between North and South Korea. However, she 
also stated that a nuclear North Korea “can never be accepted.” North Korea for the most part 
resisted Park’s outreach, and Park appears to have effectively abandoned many elements of her 
policy in the face of the North’s provocations. The Obama Administration publicly expressed 
support for President Park’s so-called “trustpolitik” policy, and since 2009 generally has appeared 
to allow Seoul to take the lead in determining how to best deal with North Korea.  
Prior to February 2016, Park’s statements on North Korea policy included elements of both 
conciliation and firmness, and she has written that her approach would “entail assuming a tough 
line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.”73 
Thus, it is possible to see Park’s February 2016 announcement of punitive measures against North 
Korea as a continuation of her approach, albeit with an almost exclusive emphasis on the “tough” 
side. During a joint press conference with President Obama in October 2015, Park was asked to 
compare North Korea and Iran’s willingness to negotiate on their nuclear weapons programs, 
particularly in light of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries.74 Park 
responded that unlike Tehran, Pyongyang has yet to  
come to its own conclusion that it is genuinely willing to give up nuclear capabilities and 
become a full-fledged member of the international society.... If they don’t have that, then 
even if we have international concerted efforts, then we won’t see a conclusion to these 
negotiations or talks like we saw with Iran.
75
 
The Pyongyang regime, led by its young leader Kim Jong-un, may feel particularly threatened by 
Park’s public calls for South Korea and the international community to prepare for and welcome 
reunification, which Park appears to assume will occur largely on South Korea’s terms.76 
Since she began campaigning for the 2012 presidential election, Park has called for creating a 
“new era” on the Korean Peninsula by building trust between North and South Korea. On the 
other hand, Park also has long stated that a nuclear North Korea “can never be accepted” and that 
building trust with Pyongyang will be impossible if it cannot keep the agreements made with 
South Korea and the international community. Park also has said that South Korea will “no longer 
                                                 
72 In March 2010, the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan suffered an explosion in its hull and sank; all 46 sailors on board 
died. A multinational investigation led by South Korea determined that a North Korean torpedo sank the vessel. In 
November 2010, North Korean artillery shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing two South Korean 
marines and two civilians and wounding dozens. 
73 Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2011. 
74 The P5+1 countries are China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. For more, see 
CRS Report R44142, Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kenneth Katzman and 
Paul K. Kerr.  
75 White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Park of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press 
Conference,” October 16, 2015.  
76 The October 2015 joint statement on North Korea says, “The United States will continue to strongly support 
[President Park’s] vision of a peacefully unified Korean Peninsula.... We will intensify high-level strategic 
consultations to create a favorable environment for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.” White House, 
“2015 United States-Republic of Korea Joint Statement on North Korea,” October 16, 2015. 
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tolerate” North Korean military attacks, that they will be met with an “immediate” South Korean 
response, and that the need for South Korea to punish North Korean military aggression “must be 
enforced more vigorously than in the past.”77 
The first step in Park’s plan has been attempting to deter North Korea’s provocations by 
strengthening South Korea’s defense capabilities, while simultaneously promoting a range of 
dialogues and projects with North Korea, generally on a relatively small scale. Among short-term 
inter-Korean initiatives, she has proposed that the two Koreas resume a regular dialogue process; 
hold regular reunions for families separated since the Korean War ended in 1953; take steps to 
link their rail systems and ports, with an eventual goal of connecting the Korean Peninsula to the 
Eurasian continent; and launch assistance programs by South Korea to help North Korean 
pregnant mothers and young children, as well as North Korea’s agricultural sector.78  
Most of Park’s inter-Korean cooperation initiatives appear to be calibrated to North Korea’s 
behavior. For instance, while she generally has de-linked family reunions and some forms of 
humanitarian assistance from overall political developments, other steps would apparently require 
bigger changes from North Korea. In particular, Park has affirmed that large-scale assistance is 
dependent on progress on denuclearization and North Korea refraining from military 
provocations.  
For a time in late 2015, relations between the two Koreas thawed, providing Park an opportunity 
to test how far her cooperative initiatives could go. Following an escalation of tensions in August, 
prompted by the aforementioned DMZ landmine explosion, the two Koreas negotiated a joint 
statement in which: 
 the two sides agreed to hold future meetings to discuss how to improve relations; 
 North Korea made a rare expression of “regret” over the landmine victims’ 
injuries; and 
 the two sides agreed to hold in fall 2015 a round of reunions for family members 
separated since the Korean War era.79 
Following the reunions of 643 South Koreans and 329 North Koreans in October 2015, the North 
Korean Red Cross reportedly said that it was willing to discuss holding regular family reunions 
and allowing letters to be exchanged between separated family members.80 Negotiations between 
the two sides, however, have not produced tangible results.  
Deterrence Issues 
One factor that may influence U.S.-ROK cooperation on North Korea is Pyongyang’s apparent 
progress in its missile and nuclear programs. North Korea’s February 2013 nuclear test, for 
instance, triggered calls in South Korea for the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons 
in the ROK and for South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons deterrent. To reassure South 
Korea and Japan after North Korea’s test, President Obama personally reaffirmed the U.S. 
security guarantee of both countries, including extended deterrence under the United States’ so-
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Joint Press Release by Ministries of Unification, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Patriots and Veterans 
Affairs, “Let’s End the Era of Division and Open Up the Era of Unification,” January 19, 2015; Ministry of Unification 
Press Release, “2015 MOU Work Plan Presented to the President,” January 19, 2015. 
79 Blue House, “Joint Press Release from the Inter-Korean High-Level Meeting,” August 25, 2015. 
80 Hyun-bi Park, “Red Cross Chair: North Open to Letter Exchanges, More Reunions,” NK News, October 26, 2015. 
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called “nuclear umbrella.” In March 2013, Park stated that “provocations by the North will be 
met by stronger counter-responses,” and the chief operations officer at South Korea’s Office of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was widely quoted as saying that if South Korea is attacked, it will 
“forcefully and decisively strike not only the origin of provocation and its supporting forces but 
also its command leadership.”81 (South Korean defense officials later clarified that “command 
leadership” referred to mid-level military commanders who direct violent attacks and not North 
Korean political leaders such as Kim Jong-un.) According to reports, since 2015 the U.S. and 
ROK militaries have prepared and exercised new war plans to strike North Korean WMD 
facilities and top leadership in an emergency situation.82  
Since North Korea’s 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, South Korean leaders have shown a 
greater willingness to countenance the use of force against North Korea. After the attack, the Lee 
government pushed the alliance to develop a new “proactive deterrence” approach that calls for a 
more flexible posture to respond to future attacks, as opposed to the “total war” scenario that 
previously drove much of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) defense planning. For instance, Lee pushed 
the United States to relax restrictions on South Korean ballistic missiles and relaxed the rules of 
engagement to allow frontline commanders greater freedom to respond to a North Korean attack 
without first asking permission from the military chain of command.83 Such changes have made 
some analysts and officials more concerned about the possibility that a small-scale North Korean 
provocation could escalate.84 U.S. defense officials insist that the exceedingly close day-to-day 
coordination in the alliance ensures that U.S.-ROK communication would be strong in the event 
of a new contingency. The 2013 “Counter-Provocation Plan” was developed to adapt both to the 
new threats envisioned from North Korea and to the South Korean government’s new attitudes 
about retaliation.  
Security Relations and the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
The United States and South Korea are allies under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the 
agreement, U.S. military personnel have maintained a continuous presence on the Korean 
Peninsula and are committed to helping South Korea defend itself, particularly against any 
aggression from the North. South Korea is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” also 
known as “extended deterrence.” The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK. In 
the past, U.S. commanders in South Korea stated that the future U.S. role in the defense of South 
Korea would be mainly an air force and naval role. The ROK armed forces today total around 
630,000 troops, with about 500,000 of them in the Army and around 65,000 each in the Air Force 
and Navy. Due to the declining birth rate, the armed forces are planning to reduce their numbers 
by nearly one-fifth by 2022.85 Since 2004, the U.S. Air Force has increased its strength in South 
Korea through the regular rotation into South Korea of advanced strike aircraft. These rotations 
                                                 
81 Blue House, “Park Geun-hye 2013 March 1st Speech,” March 1, 2013; Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Pushes Back 
on North’s Threats,” NYTimes.com, March 6, 2013. 
82 Anna Fifield, “In Drills, U.S., South Korea Practice Striking North’s Nuclear Plants,” Washington Post, March 7, 
2016. 
83 “Lee Recalls Getting Tough with N. Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2013. 
84 USFK Commander Curtis Scaparrotti testified to Congress that the cycle of action and counter-action between North 
Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance in August 2015 “could have spiraled out of control.” U.S. Congress, Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 
February 23, 2016. 
85 “South Korea to Shrink Armed Forces by a Fifth in Next 8 Years,” Stars and Stripes, March 18, 2014.  
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do not constitute a permanent presence, but the aircraft often remain in South Korea for weeks 
and sometimes months for training. 
A bilateral understanding between Washington and Seoul gives U.S. forces the “strategic 
flexibility” to respond to contingencies outside the peninsula, but under the condition that South 
Korea would have to consent to their deployment in an East Asian conflict. In the past, issues 
surrounding U.S. troop deployments have been a flashpoint for public disapproval in South Korea 
of the military alliance, led by progressive political groups. In recent years, however, public 
support for the alliance has become broader and more resilient to incidents involving U.S. bases 
and soldiers in South Korea. 
Despite the strengths of the alliance, tensions periodically arise in the partnership. Some of these 
involve typical alliance conflicts over burden sharing and cost overruns of ongoing realignment 
initiatives. Others reflect sensitive sovereignty issues involving Seoul’s control over its own 
military forces and desire to develop its own defense industry without dependence on American 
equipment.  
Upgrades to the Alliance 
Since 2009, the two sides have accelerated steps to transform the U.S.-ROK alliance, broadening 
it from its primary purpose of defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even 
global partnership. At the same time, provocations from North Korea have propelled more 
integrated bilateral planning for responding to possible contingencies. In 2011, the allies adopted 
a “proactive deterrence” policy to respond swiftly and forcefully to further provocations. 
Increasingly advanced joint military exercises have reinforced the enhanced defense partnership. 
In 2013, U.S. officials disclosed that U.S. B-52 and B-2 bombers participated in exercises held in 
South Korea, following a period of unusually hostile rhetoric from Pyongyang.86 After North 
Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016, the U.S. flew a B-52 bomber and a B-1B strategic 
bomber as a signal of commitment to South Korea. The number and pace of high-level meetings 
have also increased. Since holding their first ever so-called “2+2” meeting between the U.S. 
Secretaries of State and Defense and their South Korean counterparts in 2010, the two sides have 
held two more 2+2 meetings with an expansive agenda of cooperative initiatives that includes 
issues far beyond shared interests on the Korean Peninsula. These areas include cybersecurity, 
space, missile defense, nuclear safety, climate change, Ebola, and multiple issues in the Middle 
East. Since 2011, the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) has held biannual 
meetings at the Deputy Minister level to serve as the umbrella framework for multiple U.S.-ROK 
bilateral security initiatives, the latest of which took place in Seoul mid-September 2016. The 
United States and ROK also regularly conduct a Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between 
the Secretary of Defense and Ministry of National Defense to reaffirm the alliance, analyze key 
threats, consult on weapon systems, coordinate the strategic posture, and discuss matters of 
mutual interest such as the wartime operational control (Opcon) transition plan (discussed 
below).87 
                                                 
86 Jay Solomon, Julian Barnes, and Alastair Gale, “North Korea Warned—U.S. Flies Stealth Bombers over Peninsula in 
Show of Might,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2013. 
87 “Full text of 47th ROK-U.S. Joint Communique,” United States Forces Korea, November 1, 2015, Available at 
http://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/626859/full-text-of-47th-rok-us-joint-communique/.  
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Ballistic Missile Defense and THAAD Deployment 
The decision in July 2016 to deploy the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense missile defense 
system took place after years of consideration and controversy in South Korea. According to 
reports, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) had been considering deploying one of its 
THAAD systems to South Korea since 2014.88 As the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles 
appeared to intensify, the United States and South Korea began examining how to improve their 
BMD capabilities to defend South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there. The United States urged 
South Korea to develop or procure advanced BMD capabilities and to integrate them with U.S. 
and allied BMD systems in the region. In 2014, the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral James “Sandy” Winnefeld, stated that a regional missile defense system would be 
more effective against North Korean missile launches and would share the burden of defense 
among allies. 89 However, Washington and Seoul initially settled on a policy of interoperability 
rather than integration. Seoul was resistant to the concept of a regional integrated BMD system 
for several reasons: the desire, especially strong among progressive Koreans, for more strategic 
autonomy; a reluctance to irritate China, which had consistently voiced opposition to U.S. BMD 
deployments; and a disinclination to cooperate with Japan due to poor relations based on disputes 
over historical and territorial issues. 
South Korea has placed an emphasis on indigenous development of high-technology defense 
systems. South Korea is developing its own missile defense system, called Korea Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD), which could be compared to the U.S.-produced PAC-2—a second-generation 
Patriot air defense system. KAMD would be interoperable with alliance systems and could 
gradually incorporate more advanced BMD equipment as those elements are procured. In 2015, 
Korea’s Ministry of National Defense announced a budget of $703 million to develop KAMD and 
Kill Chain—a missile system designed to detect, target, and destroy DPRK military 
installations—within the next 10 years. The ROK Navy has three destroyers with Aegis tracking 
software that could be upgraded but no missile interceptors, and the ROK Army fields PAC-2 
interceptors. South Korea reportedly plans to upgrade PAC-2 systems in Seoul to PAC-3 versions 
by 2022. ROK contracted Raytheon to upgrade its Patriot Air and Missile Defense System 
batteries for $770 million in March 2015.90 A PAC-3 interceptor unit was briefly transferred from 
U.S. Forces Japan to Gunsan, North Jeolla Province in South Korea for joint training drills with 
ROK units in July 2016.91  
After the North Korean satellite launch in February 2016, U.S. and ROK officials made a joint 
statement that the allies would examine the deployment of THAAD to South Korea, prompting 
harsh reactions from China and Russia. China complained that the THAAD system’s powerful X-
band radar could be configured to allow the United States to monitor airspace deep into Chinese 
territory, and some Chinese analysts believe that the radar could, in combination with other BMD 
upgrades, place the United States in a position to nullify China’s strategic nuclear deterrent.92 The 
                                                 
88 Julian Barnes, “Washington Considers Missile-Defense System in South Korea,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2014. 
89 Paul McLeary, “Burden Sharing Is the Future of Asian Missile Defense, Pentagon Official Says,” Defense News, 
May 28, 2014. 
90 Raytheon, “Republic of Korea Upgrades Its Air and Missile Defense,” press release, March 30, 2015, available at 
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91 Jun Ji-hye. “US Brings PAC-3 Unit to Korea,” July 22, 2016, Available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
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92 Elbridge Colby and Wu Riqiang, Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain, 
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Chinese ambassador to Seoul reportedly warned in February 2016 that the China-ROK 
relationship could be “destroyed in an instant” if the United States places THAAD in South 
Korea.93 South Korean officials and politicians have protested China’s posture, defending the 
utility of the BMD system for intercepting North Korean missiles.  
The Relocation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) 
The planned realignment of all U.S. forces from bases near the de-militarized zone (DMZ) border 
with North Korea to bases farther south is progressing after initial delays, but challenges with 
USFK force posture remain. Troop levels remain at about 28,500. The realignment plan reflects 
the shift toward a supporting role for USFK and a desire to resolve the issues arising from the 
location of the large U.S. Yongsan base in downtown Seoul. 2017 is anticipated to be a year of 
major movement of personnel to the new base in Pyeongtaek. 
The USFK base relocation plan has two elements. The first involves the transfer of a large 
percentage of the 9,000 U.S. military personnel at the Yongsan base to U.S. Army Garrison 
(USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 miles south of Seoul. 
The second element involves the relocation of about 10,000 troops of the Second Infantry 
Division from the demilitarized zone to areas south of the Han River (which runs through Seoul). 
The end result would be that USFK sites will decline to 96, from 174 in 2002. The bulk of U.S. 
forces will be clustered in the two primary “hubs” of Osan Air Base/USAG Humphreys and 
USAG Daegu that contain five “enduring sites” (Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG 
Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base). U.S. counter-fires (counter-artillery) forces 
stationed near the DMZ are the exception to this overall relocation. The United States and South 
Korea agreed that those U.S. units would not relocate to USAG Humphreys until the South 
Korean counter-fires reinforcement plan is completed around 2020.94 The city of Dongducheon, 
where those soldiers are based, has protested this decision and withdrawn some cooperation with 
the U.S. Army.95 
The relocations to Pyeongtaek originally were scheduled for completion in 2008, but have been 
postponed several times because of the slow construction of new facilities at Pyeongtaek and 
South Korean protests of financial difficulties in paying the ROK share of the relocation costs. 
The commander of USFK stated that 65% of the relocation program was complete as of the end 
of 2015, and that “the majority of unit relocations will occur through 2018.”96 The original cost 
estimate was over $10 billion; South Korea was to contribute $4 billion of this. Estimates in 2010 
placed the overall costs at over $13 billion. In congressional testimony in April 2016, a U.S. 
official stated that South Korea is funding 91% of the total $10.7 billion cost of USFK 
relocations.97 U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert testified to Congress in June 2014 that the 
Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program (privately developed housing for servicemembers and 
their families inside the base) was a “challenging issue” and that the Defense Department was re-
                                                 
93 Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Tells China Not to Intervene in Missile-Defense System Talks,” New York Times, 
February 24, 2016. 
94 “Joint Communique of the 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
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96 Written testimony of General Curtis Scaparrotti. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on 
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examining housing plans at USAG Humphreys.98 In 2013, USFK broke ground for the new 
headquarters of the U.S.-Korea Command (KORCOM) and United Nations Command (UNC) in 
Pyeongtaek. The facility is to become the command center for U.S. forces after the planned 
transfer of wartime operational control.  
Figure 3. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan Is Implemented 
 
Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, date posted April 15, 2010. 
Tour Normalization Debate and Rotation of Army Units to South Korea99 
Another complicating factor in the development of the Yongsan Relocation Plan is the 
announcement by the Pentagon in 2008 that U.S. military families, for the first time, would be 
allowed to join U.S. military personnel in South Korea. Most U.S. troops in South Korea serve 
one-year unaccompanied assignments. The goal was to phase out one-year unaccompanied tours 
in South Korea, replacing them with 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours. 
Supporters of the plan argued that accompanied tours create a more stable force because of 
longer, more comfortable tours. If implemented, the “normalization” of tours would increase the 
size of the U.S. military community at Osan/Humphries near Pyeongtaek to over 50,000. 
Some Members of Congress raised strong concerns about existing plans to relocate U.S. bases in 
South Korea and normalize the tours of U.S. troops there. In 2011, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) passed amendments to the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act that 
prevents the obligation of any funds for tour normalization until further reviews of the plan are 
considered and a complete plan is provided to Congress. The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239) includes a provision (Section 2107) that continues 
to prohibit funds for tour normalization. For the time being, at least, the DOD has “stopped 
pursuing Tour Normalization as an initiative for Korea.”100 In 2013, USFK released a statement 
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saying, “while improvements to readiness remain the command’s first priority, tour normalization 
is not affordable at this time.”101 A 2013 SASC report criticized the policy change as expensive 
and questioned the legality of how DOD calculated the housing allowance.102 
In October 2013, the U.S. Army began a program of rotating units to South Korea for a nine-
month tour of duty in lieu of having selected combat units permanently based in South Korea. 
Some defense analysts have raised concerns about the cost and the effectiveness of rotational 
forces vis-a-vis permanently assigned forces. Those favoring permanently assigned forces cite the 
benefits of having greater familiarity and experience with the challenging and complex terrain in 
South Korea as well as its unique climatic conditions. Another perceived benefit of permanently 
assigned forces is the opportunity they provide to develop long-term relationships with South 
Korean military counterparts. On the other hand, the Army suggests there are benefits of 
employing rotational forces in lieu of permanently assigned units.103 Noting troops are typically 
stationed in South Korea for one- or two-year tours, Army officials reportedly suggest this leads 
to frequent turnover of personnel in permanently assigned units, detracting from unit cohesion 
and impacting a unit’s effectiveness. In the case of rotational units, they typically arrive in Korea 
shortly after a deployment to a Combat Training Center at a high state of readiness and without 
having to contend with the significant turnover of Korea-assigned units. Army officials suggest 
that the advantages of rotational units outweigh their initial unfamiliarity with the terrain, climate, 
and their South Korean counterparts. 
Cost Sharing  
Since 1991, South Korea has provided financial support through a series of Special Measures 
Agreements (SMAs) to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. In January 2014, Seoul 
and Washington agreed to terms for the next five-year SMA, covering 2014-2018. Under the new 
agreement, Seoul will raise its contribution by 6% to 920 billion Korean won ($867 million) in 
2014 and then increase its annual payments at the rate of inflation. According to congressional 
testimony by General Vincent Brooks, South Korea paid 932 billion won ($824 million) in 2015 
and 944 billion won ($821 million) in 2016, equal to about 50% of the total non-personnel costs 
of U.S. troop presence on the peninsula. In addition, South Korea is paying $9.74 billion for the 
relocation of several U.S. bases within the country and construction of new military facilities.104  
The new SMA makes U.S. use of South Korean funds more transparent than in the past, in 
response to South Korean criticism. The ROK Ministry of Defense must approve every contract 
for which SMA funds are obligated, and USFK is to submit an annual report on the SMA funds to 
the National Assembly. Even with these changes, Korean opposition lawmakers complained that 
the agreement is “humiliating” and that USFK might use SMA funds to finance portions of the 
relocation plan (see above) in violation of the 2004 agreement.  
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Opcon Transfer 
The United States has agreed to turn over the wartime command of Korean troops to South 
Korea, but the two sides have postponed this transfer for several years. Under the current 
command arrangement, which is a legacy of U.S. leadership of the U.N. coalition in the 1950-
1953 Korean War, South Korean soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if there 
were a war on the peninsula. The plan to transfer wartime operational control recognizes South 
Korea’s advances in economic and military strength since the Korean War and is seen by many 
Koreans as important for South Korean sovereignty. Progressive parties in South Korea generally 
support hastening the transition, arguing that the U.S. presence influences North Korea to 
accelerate its military buildup.  
Under a 2007 agreement, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been 
headed by the U.S. commander in Korea, is to be replaced with separate U.S. and ROK military 
commands; the provisional name of the new U.S. command is Korea Command (KORCOM). 
When the U.S. and ROK militaries operate as a combined force under the new command 
structure, U.S. forces may be under the operational command of a Korean general officer, but 
U.S. general officers are to be in charge of U.S. subcomponents.105 A bilateral Military 
Cooperation Center would be responsible for planning military operations, military exercises, 
logistics support, and intelligence exchanges, and assisting in the operation of the 
communication, command, control, and computer systems. It is unclear what role the U.N. 
Command, which the USFK Commander also holds, will have in the future arrangement. 
In 2014, South Korea’s Minister of Defense reportedly announced that the goal was to transfer 
Opcon in 2023, stressing the completion of the Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD) 
by 2020 as an important step in the transfer process.106 To that effect, The Ministry of Defense 
announced that $1.36 billion would be invested in the KAMD system in 2017.107 In 2010, the 
Opcon transfer was postponed to 2015 after a series of provocations from North Korea and amid 
concerns about whether South Korean forces were adequately prepared to assume responsibility. 
As the new deadline of 2015 grew closer, concerns again emerged about the timing. Reportedly, 
South Korean officials worried that their military was not fully prepared to cope with North 
Korean threats and that Pyongyang might interpret the Opcon transfer as a weakening of the 
alliance’s deterrence.108 Some military experts expressed concern that turning over control would 
lead to the United States reducing its overall commitment to South Korean security.109 In October 
2014, the United States and South Korea announced in a joint statement that the allies would take 
a “conditions-based approach” to the Opcon transfer and determine the appropriate timing based 
on South Korean military capabilities and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.110 
The decisions to delay the Opcon transfer could be interpreted as a flexible adjustment to changed 
circumstances on the Korean Peninsula or as emblematic of problems with following through on 
difficult alliance decisions. 
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In testimony to Congress in April 2015, then-USFK Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti 
explained the three general conditions for Opcon transfer:111  
 South Korea must develop the command and control capacity to lead a combined 
and multinational force in high-intensity conflict, 
 South Korea must improve its capabilities to respond to the growing nuclear and 
missile threat in North Korea, and 
 The Opcon transition should take place at a time that is conducive to a transition. 
Scaparrotti stated that main areas of attention for improving South Korea’s capabilities will be C4 
(command, control, computers, and communication systems), BMD, munitions, and ISR 
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets. Reportedly, the Opcon transfer may not 
occur until 2020 or later.112 
South Korean Defense Industry and Purchases of U.S. Weapon Systems 
South Korea is a major purchaser of U.S. weapon systems and is regularly among the top 
customers for Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Over the five years from FY2009 to FY2014, South 
Korea signed FMS contracts for $6.69 billion of U.S defense equipment, in total. Although South 
Korea generally buys the majority of its weapons from the United States, European and Israeli 
defense companies also compete for contracts; Korea is an attractive market because of its rising 
defense expenditures.  
South Korea is to purchase the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to be its next main 
fighter aircraft, after the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in September 2013 threw out the 
yearlong acquisition process that selected the Boeing F-15SE fighter.113 The cost of the F-35 had 
been too high for the original bid, according to reports, but Korean defense officials determined 
that only the F-35 met their requirements for advanced stealth capability. South Korea is to 
purchase 40 F-35 fighters at a total cost of $7.83 billion, with the first delivery of aircraft 
scheduled for 2018.114 The transfer of advanced defense technologies to South Korea was a key 
incentive in the contract with Lockheed Martin, according to reports, but the U.S. government 
denied the transfer of several technologies that the MND had been expecting to use in its own 
KF-X fighter development program.115 The inability to secure the transfer of these four cutting-
edge technologies from the United States became a minor scandal in South Korea in October 
2015 and led President Park’s top security advisor to resign. According to a 2013 article in 
Foreign Policy, U.S. officials were concerned that South Korea was exploiting U.S. defense 
technology in its indigenously produced equipment, and these concerns may have been a factor in 
the decision to deny the transfer of advanced electronic scanner array (AESA) technology.116 
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South Korea is to also purchase four RQ-4 “Global Hawk” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at a 
price of $657 million in total.117 Given concerns that the sale could violate the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and non-proliferation norms, observers have called on the 
Obama Administration to ensure that the Global Hawks are used strictly for reconnaissance and 
are not armed.118 Currently, the South Korean military operates reconnaissance UAVs; the MND 
budgeted $447 million to indigenously develop a combat UAV by 2021.119  
Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 initiative emphasizes the development of indigenous capabilities 
by increasing the percentage of funds allocated to defense research and development (R&D).120 
For example, South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in 
2016 that government funding will be provided for industries that focus on the development of 
essential parts for weapons systems.121 The defense spending increase is also tied to South Korean 
strategic objectives, including a three-axis defense plan that seeks to integrate Korea Air and 
Missile Defense (KAMD), Kill Chain, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation 
(KMPR) plan with USFK systems and capabilities. South Korea aims to improve the 
competitiveness of its defense industry, but reported problems with the reliability of certain 
systems pose a challenge; South Korean firms compete internationally in the armored vehicle, 
shipbuilding, and aerospace industries.122 Lockheed Martin and Korea Aerospace Industries 
jointly developed the T-50 Golden Eagle, a trainer and light fighter aircraft that has been 
successful on the international market and will likely compete for the U.S. Air Force’s next 
trainer aircraft contract.  
Southeast Asia is considered to be a major market for South Korean defense equipment. Recent 
international arms sales include 12 FA-50 light aircraft sold to the Philippines for $420 million, 
three diesel electric attack submarines sold to Indonesia for $1.1 billion, a frigate sold to Thailand 
for $486 million, and six missile surface corvettes sold to Malaysia for $1.2 billion.  
The 110th Congress passed legislation that upgraded South Korea’s status as an arms purchaser 
from a Major Non-NATO Ally to the NATO Plus Three category (P.L. 110-429), which has 
become NATO Plus Five. This upgrade establishes a higher dollar threshold for the requirement 
that the U.S. executive branch notify Congress of pending arms sales to South Korea, from $14 
million to $25 million. Congress has 15 days to consider the sale and take legislative steps to 
block the sale compared to 30 days for Major Non-NATO Allies. 
South Korea’s Regional Relations  
Looking at their surrounding neighborhood, South Koreans sometimes refer to their country as a 
“shrimp among whales.” South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, especially the latter, 
combine interdependence and rivalry. Until 2013, trilateral cooperation among the three capitals 
generally had been increasing, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
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Between 2009 and 2012, leaders of the three countries met annually in standalone summits, 
established a trilateral secretariat in Seoul, signed an investment agreement, and laid the 
groundwork for trilateral FTA negotiations to begin.123 In 2013, however, tensions between South 
Korea and Japan and between China and Japan froze much of this burgeoning trilateral 
cooperation. This hiatus lasted until November 2015, when the three countries resumed their 
trilateral leaders’ meetings in Seoul. Japan is to host the next such gathering. Even during the 
freeze, the three countries continued their trilateral FTA negotiations, which were launched in 
November 2012.  
Park Geun-hye often speaks of a Northeast Asian “paradox,” in which there is a “disconnect 
between growing economic interdependence on the one hand and backward political-security 
cooperation on the other.” To resolve this situation, Park has proposed a Northeast Asian Peace 
and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) to build trust among Northeast Asian countries and alleviate 
security problems through cooperation on non-traditional security issues, such as nuclear safety 
and the environment. Critics contend that NAPCI has yet to produce concrete results or define its 
objectives clearly.  
South Korea-Japan Relations 
South Korea’s relations with Japan, strained since 2012, improved modestly in 2015, due in large 
measure to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s avoidance of flagrantly inflammatory actions 
or statements on historical issues, the strength of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and Park’s decision 
to relax her previous linkage between the Japanese government treatment of history issues and 
Seoul’s willingness to participate in most forms of high-level bilateral activities.124 Park 
responded to Prime Minister Abe’s August 2015 statement commemorating the end of World War 
II by expressing disappointment that Abe “did not quite live up to our expectations,” but also by 
speaking somewhat positively about other aspects of his statement.125  
Tensions between South Korea and Japan limit U.S. policy options in Northeast Asia and 
periodically cause difficulties between Washington and one or both of its two allies in Northeast 
Asia. Seoul and Tokyo disagree over how Imperial Japan’s actions in the early 20th century should 
be handled in contemporary relations. The relationship is also challenged by conflicting territorial 
claims and strategic and economic competition. The ongoing opportunity costs to the United 
States have led some policy analysts to call for the United States to become more directly 
involved in trying to improve relations between South Korea and Japan.126  
U.S. policymakers have long encouraged enhanced South Korea-Japan relations. A cooperative 
relationship between the two countries, both U.S. treaty allies, and among the three is in U.S. 
interests because it arguably enhances regional stability, helps coordination over North Korea 
policy, and boosts each country’s ability to deal with the strategic challenges posed by China’s 
rise. However, despite increased cooperation, closeness, and interdependence between the South 
Korean and Japanese governments, people, and businesses over the past decade, mistrust on 
historical and territorial issues continues to linger. South Korea and Japan have competing claims 
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to the small Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea by Koreans), and 
most South Koreans complain that Japan has not adequately acknowledged its history of 
aggression against Korea.127 For more than three generations beginning in the late 19th century, 
Japan intervened directly in Korean affairs, culminating in the annexation of the Korean 
peninsula in 1910. Over the next 35 years, Imperial Japan all but attempted to subjugate Korean 
culture.128 Among the victims were tens of thousands129 of South Korean “comfort women” who 
during the 1930s and 1940s were recruited, many if not most by coercive measures, into 
providing sexual services for Japanese soldiers. Whenever South Koreans perceive that Japanese 
officials are downplaying or denying this history, it becomes difficult for South Korean leaders to 
support initiatives to institutionalize improvements in bilateral ties.  
“Comfort Women”-Related Legislation 
The U.S. House of Representatives has taken an interest in the comfort women issue. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 
759 was passed by the House International Relations Committee on September 13, 2006, but was not voted on by 
the full House. In the 110th Congress, H.Res. 121, with 167 co-sponsors, was passed in the House on July 30, 2007, by 
voice vote. This resolution expresses the sense of the House that Japan should “formally acknowledge, apologize, and 
accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner” for its abuses of the comfort women. The text of 
the resolution calls the system “unprecedented in its cruelty” and “one of the largest cases of human trafficking in the 
20th century,” asserts that some Japanese textbooks attempt to downplay this and other war crimes, and states that 
some Japanese officials have tried to dilute the Kono Statement. In the 113th Congress, the 2014 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, H.R. 3547) indirectly referred to this resolution. P.L. 113-76’s conference committee 
issued a Joint Explanatory Statement that called on Federal Agencies to implement directives contained in the July 
2013 H.Rept. 113-185, which in turn “urge[d] the Secretary of State to encourage the Government of Japan to 
address the issues raised” in H.Res. 121. 
South Koreans’ interest in forming significant new institutional arrangements with Japan is 
dampened by three domestic factors in South Korea. First, continued suspicions of Japan among 
the South Korean population place political limitations on how far and how fast Korean leaders 
can improve relations. Second, continued disagreements over Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty 
continue to weigh down the relationship. Third, unlike Japan, South Korea generally does not 
view China as an existential challenge and territorial threat. South Korea also needs Chinese 
cooperation on North Korea. Accordingly, South Korean leaders tend to be much more wary of 
taking steps that will alarm China. A factor that could change this calculation is if China is seen as 
enabling North Korean aggression. North Korean acts of provocation are often followed by 
breakthroughs in ROK-Japan relations, as well as in ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. 
South Korea-China Relations 
China’s rise influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and economic policy. North 
Korea’s growing dependence on China since the early 2000s has meant that South Korea must 
increasingly factor Beijing’s actions and intentions into its North Korea policy. China’s influence 
over North Korea has tended to manifest itself in a number of ways in Seoul. For instance, 
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Chinese support or opposition could be decisive in shaping the outcome of South Korea’s 
approaches to North Korea, both in the short term (such as handling sudden crises) and the long 
term (such as contemplating how to bring about re-unification). For this reason, a key objective of 
the joint Park/Obama policy toward North Korea is trying to alter China’s calculation of its own 
strategic interests so that they might be more closely aligned with Seoul and Washington rather 
than with Pyongyang. Additionally, many South Koreans worry that China’s economy is pulling 
North Korea, particularly its northern provinces, into China’s orbit.  
On the other hand, China’s continued support for North Korea, particularly its perceived backing 
of Pyongyang after the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, has angered many South Koreans, 
particularly conservatives. China’s treatment of North Korean refugees, many of whom are 
forcibly repatriated to North Korea, has also become a bilateral irritant. Many South Korean 
conservatives also express concern that the Chinese have been unwilling to discuss plans for 
dealing with various contingencies involving instability in North Korea, though beginning in 
2013 there were signs that Beijing had become more willing to engage in these discussions. Park 
Geun-hye has called for establishing a trilateral strategic dialogue among Korea, the United 
States, and China that presumably could discuss various situations involving North Korea.130 
These calls increased in the weeks after North Korea’s 2016 nuclear test and satellite launch. 
Since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, China has emerged as South Korea’s 
most important economic partner. Over 20% of South Korea’s total trade is with China, twice the 
level for South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-Japan trade.131 For years, China has been the number 
one location for South Korean firms’ foreign direct investment, and the two countries signed a 
bilateral FTA in 2015. Yet, even as China is an important source of South Korean economic 
growth, it also looms large as an economic competitor. Fears of increased competition with 
Chinese enterprises have been an important motivator for South Korea’s push to negotiate a series 
of FTAs with other major trading partners around the globe.  
Park Geun-hye has placed a priority on improving South Korea’s relations with China, which 
generally are thought to have been cool during Lee Myung-bak’s tenure. The two sides have 
expanded a number of high-level arrangements designed to boost strategic communication and 
dialogue. As president, Park has held six summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In early 
September 2015, Park Geun-hye visited Beijing for a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping 
and to attend a parade marking the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War 
II, officially titled the “Commemoration of 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People’s 
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War.” Aside from the president 
of the Czech Republic, Park was the only leader of a U.S. ally and major democracy to attend the 
event, which featured a large parade of Chinese military hardware through Tiananmen Square. 
Park’s appearance at the celebration caused some observers, particularly in Japan, to express 
concerns that South Korea and China are consolidating an anti-Japanese partnership and/or that 
Seoul is drifting into Beijing’s orbit. Other observers suggested that this is not necessarily the 
case, pointing out that in the context of unprecedentedly weak ties between Beijing and 
Pyongyang, Park has sought to consolidate China’s support for Korean unification and strategic 
coordination with Seoul and Washington at the expense of Pyongyang.132 The Blue House 
reported that the two leaders agreed that Korean reunification “would contribute to peace and 
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prosperity across the region.”133 If accurate, such a discussion could indicate an increased 
willingness by China to more openly discuss the reunification of the two Koreas. 
Notably, Xi’s first visit to the Korean Peninsula as president was to South Korea, not to China’s 
ally, North Korea. Although Xi and Park have described bilateral ties as having reached an 
“unprecedented level of strategic understanding,” most analysts do not expect that South Korea 
will prioritize relations with China at the expense of the U.S. alliance. Many South Koreans point 
to fundamental differences between Seoul’s and Beijing’s interests in North Korea, and increasing 
rivalry between Chinese and South Korean firms in recent years has accentuated the economic 
competition between the two countries.134 
Economic Relations 
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. In 2015, two-way goods and 
services trade between the two countries totaled $150 billion (Table 1), making South Korea the 
United States’ seventh-largest trading partner. For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South 
Korean market is even more important. South Korea is far more dependent economically on the 
United States than the United States is on South Korea. In terms of goods trade, in 2015, the 
United States was South Korea’s second-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, 
and the third-largest source of imports. In 2013, it was among South Korea’s largest suppliers of 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  
As South Korea has emerged as a major industrialized economy, and as both countries have 
become more integrated with the world economy, economic interdependence has become more 
complex and attenuated. In particular, the United States’ economic importance to South Korea has 
declined relative to other major powers. In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United 
States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number one trading partner. Japan and the 28-
member European Union each also rival and have at times surpassed the United States as South 
Korea’s second-largest trading partner.  
South Korea’s export-driven economy and subsequent competition with domestic U.S. producers 
in certain products has also led to some trade frictions with the United States. For example, 
imports of certain South Korean products—mostly steel or stainless steel items as well as 
polyester, chemicals, and washing machines—have been the subject of U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations. As of September 26, 2016, for instance, antidumping duties 
were being collected on 18 South Korean imports, and countervailing duties were being assessed 
on 5 South Korean products.135 
The KORUS FTA 
The George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations initiated the KORUS FTA negotiations 
in 2006 and signed the agreement in June 2007.136 In 2011, the House and Senate passed H.R. 
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3080, the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, which was 
subsequently signed by President Obama.137 In March 2012, the U.S.-South Korea FTA entered 
into force. 
Upon the date of implementation of the KORUS FTA, 82% of U.S. tariff lines and 80% of South 
Korean tariff lines were tariff free in U.S.-South Korean trade, whereas prior to the KORUS FTA, 
38% of U.S. tariff lines and 13% of South Korean tariff lines were duty free. By the 10th year of 
the agreement, the figures are to rise to an estimated 99% and 98%, respectively, with tariff 
elimination occurring in stages and the most sensitive products having the longest phase-out 
periods. Non-tariff barriers in goods trade and barriers in services trade and foreign investment 
are to be reduced or eliminated under the KORUS FTA.  
The KORUS FTA has been in force for four years as of March 15, 2016, but some provisions of 
the agreement have yet to take effect and tariffs on certain products continue to phase out. Table 
1 below presents U.S.-South Korea trade data for selected years. A number of factors influence 
overall trade flows, including fluctuations in the business cycle, exchange rates, and the level of 
aggregate demand, making it difficult to directly assess how KORUS has impacted U.S. trade 
with South Korea. While the United States has significantly expanded its services exports and 
nearly tripled vehicle exports (albeit from a low base) to South Korea since implementation of the 
FTA, overall U.S. imports from South Korea have risen faster than exports, causing a rise in the 
U.S. trade deficit with South Korea. In dollar terms, South Korea’s worldwide imports fell in 
2015, including from Japan and the United States, also contributing to the increased U.S. trade 
deficit with South Korea, and highlighting that a variety of factors impact trade flows. 
South Korea’s implementation of its KORUS commitments has also been an ongoing concern in 
the bilateral trade relationship. While U.S. officials note that progress has been made, some 
stakeholders argue that certain issues persist.138 In a March 2016 letter to the South Korean 
Ambassador, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch expressed concern over South 
Korea’s regulatory process for allowing financial services companies to transfer data in and out of 
the country as required by the KORUS FTA, as well as country of origin verifications by the 
South Korean customs service.139 Senator Hatch also requested South Korean action to improve 
transparency and predictability of pricing and reimbursements for pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, and fully implement commitments regarding legal services and U.S. firms’ abilities to 
invest in and operate with South Korean law firms. In its 2016 report on trade barriers, USTR 
also noted industry group claims that the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), South Korea’s 
competition enforcement agency, has unfairly targeted foreign firms in recent enforcement 
activities, a potential violation of KORUS obligations on non-discriminatory treatment.140 
                                                 
137 The House vote was 278-151. In the Senate, the vote was 83-15. 
138 White House, “Remarks by President Obama at Business Roundtable,” press release, April 26, 2014. See also 
USTR, “KORUS FTA: Year Three in Deepening Market Integration. Remarks by Assistant USTR Bruce Hirsh,” 
March 12, 2015; “Hirsh Hits Positive Note on Korea TPP Candidacy,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 20, 2015. 
139 Letter from Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, to Honorable Ahn Ho-Young, 
Ambassador to the United States of the Republic of Korea, March 2, 2016. 
140 USTR, 2016 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2016, p. 282. Article 16.1 of the KORUS 
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Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Trade, 
Selected Years 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
Year 
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Trade Balance Total Trade 
Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services 
2005 28.6 9.4 44.2 6.9 -15.6 2.5 72.9 16.3 
2010 39.8 15.5 49.8 9.3 -10.0 6.1 89.5 24.8 
2011 45.2 16.7 57.6 9.7 -12.4 6.9 102.8 26.4 
2012* 44.4 18.2 59.6 10.6 -15.2 7.5 103.9 28.8 
2013 43.5 21.0 63.0 10.8 -19.5 10.2 106.5 31.8 
2014 46.1 20.7 69.8 10.4 -23.7 10.2 116.0 31.1 




Goods: Semiconductors and semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment; civilian aircraft; medical 
equipment; chemicals; motor vehicles and parts; 
plastics; corn and wheat; and beef and pork. 
Services: South Korean educational, personal, and 
business travel to the United States; charges for the 
use of intellectual property; financial and other business 




Goods: Motor vehicles and parts; cell phones; 
computers, tablets, and their components; iron and 
steel and products; jet fuel and motor oil; plastics; and 
tires. 
Services: Transport services; business and personal 
travel. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), FT-900, March 4, 2016. 
Notes: Trade data reported on a balance of payments basis. 
a. The KORUS FTA went into effect on March 15, 2012. 
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South Korea-U.S. Interaction over the TPP 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA was signed by 12 countries, including the United States, Japan, and other 
major South Korean trading partners, in February 2016. 141  It now awaits ratification by each member, including 
implementing legislation passed by Congress in the United States, before it can enter into force. Since 2013, South 
Korea has signaled its “interest” in joining TPP. The next step for South Korea to enter the TPP would be to formally 
announce it is seeking to participate, which Trade Minister Joo Hyung-hwan in October 2016 reportedly suggested 
would come soon, and then engage in formal bilateral consultations with TPP partners. 142 The Obama Administration 
has welcomed South Korea’s interest, but currently remains focused on ratification among the current members. 
Presumably, South Korea will not be able to join the TPP until that process is completed. If Congress does not 
consider the implementing legislation during its current session, however, U.S. ratification may be unlikely in the near 
term as a new Administration is put into place and as neither presidential candidate currently supports TPP. Delayed 
consideration of the agreement could increase the possibility for additional countries to join the current tranche of 
participants or could delay the accession of new members further if current TPP partners wish to wait until it is 
implemented among them first. 
The accession procedures provided in the TPP state that all TPP parties would have to agree to any new members 
and the terms of their accession, though it is not entirely clear what that specific process would be. The accession 
process used for the World Trade Organization (WTO)—countries agree to the established rules of the agreement 
and then negotiate market access commitments (tariffs and quotas)—may serve as a template. South Korea has 
reportedly engaged with the current members to discuss its potential participation. 
Congressional perceptions of the economic impact of the KORUS FTA and South Korea’s willingness and ability to 
resolve ongoing KORUS implementation issues may affect South Korea’s potential participation in the TPP. While 
some herald KORUS as an economic success, citing increased exports of some U.S. products, including autos and 
services, certain U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns over specific ongoing trade issues with South Korea and 
some raise the increased bilateral trade deficit since KORUS went into effect as a major concern.143  
For South Korea, entry into TPP would align with President Park’s policies to revive the Korean economy—a top 
priority for her government. It would continue the country’s strategy of entering into FTAs in order to make South 
Korea a “linchpin” of accelerated economic integration in the region.144 South Korea entered into an FTA with the 
European Union in 2011 and more recent bilateral FTAs with Australia and China entered into force in late 2014 and 
2015, respectively. South Korea also continues to participate in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) trade negotiations that include most East and Southeast Asian countries, including China, India, Australia, and 
New Zealand, but not the United States. 
In addition to ratification authority of the final agreement, Congress also has an ongoing formal and informal role in 
developing the TPP text. This includes ongoing oversight, especially in terms of U.S. trade negotiating objectives and 
ongoing consultation and notification mechanisms as part of U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA), which Congress 
passed in June 2015 (P.L. 114-26). 145 Through TPA, Congress also grants expedited legislative consideration to trade 
agreements negotiated by the President, including TPP. 
South Korea’s Economic Performance 
South Korean firms are heavily reliant on international markets. International trade (imports and 
exports) was more than 100% of South Korean GDP from 2012 to 2014. This level of integration 
makes the country particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the global economy, as seen during 
                                                 
141 The TPP negotiating parties are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. For more, see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 
Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams.  
142 Koichi Kato, “South Korea Warming to TPP,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 12, 2016. 
143 James W. Fatheree, The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement at Three, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, March 13, 2015; 
Robert E. Scott, U.S.-Korea Trade Deal Resulted in Growing Trade Deficits and More than 75,000 Lost Jobs, 
Economic Policy Institute, March 30, 2015. 
144 Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy Press Release 436, “Korea Outlines New Trade Policy Direction,” June 25, 
2013.  
145 For more on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade 
Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson. 
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the global financial crisis that began in 2008. South Korea’s real GDP growth declined to 0.7% in 
2009 as the world economy dipped into deep recession. Growth recovered to 6.5% in 2010, 
following the government’s large fiscal stimulus and record-low interest rates, and has hovered 
around 3% since (Figure 4). However, South Korea remains vulnerable to a slowdown in its 
major export markets: China, the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The government 
has used a mixture of monetary and fiscal stimulus over the past several years to support the 
domestic economy. Most recently, in June 2016, the Park government announced a $17 billion 
stimulus package.146 The same month, the Bank of Korea cut South Korea’s base interest rate to a 
record-low 1.25%, citing continued decline in exports and weak domestic demand.147 
Figure 4. South Korea’s Real GDP Growth, 2007-2015 
 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
South Korea’s post-2008 crisis average growth of around 3% is 2 percentage points lower than its 
5% average during the decade leading up to the crisis. This lower growth has become a major 
policy concern for South Korea, especially given the country’s rapid economic success over the 
past several decades. Many economists argue that the South Korean economy would benefit from 
a number of structural reforms, such as attempts to spur the productivity of the services sector, 
which lags behind the manufacturing dynamos in the Korean economy.148 Another item on the 
potential reform agenda is the removal of labor market rigidities, which have created an incentive 
for South Korean companies to hire easily fired temporary workers rather than highly protected 
full-time employees with benefits packages. The Park government has attempted to address some 
of these issues through its reform initiatives to varying effect, but disagreements between the 
South Korean government, industry, and union leaders over the nature of labor reforms has stalled 
the process.149 
                                                 
146 “South Korea Plans Stimulus Boost in Wake of Brexit,” Financial Times, June 28, 2016. 
147 Bank of Korea, “Monetary Policy Decision,” June 9, 2016. 
148 Lee Jong-Wha, “Starting South Korea’s New Growth Engines,” Project Syndicate, January 26, 2015. 
149 “South Korea Impasse Delays Labour Market Shake-Up,” Financial Times, February 24, 2016. 
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In addition, complaints in South Korea have risen in recent years that rich individuals and large 
conglomerates (called chaebol)—which continue to dominate the economy—have benefitted 
disproportionately from the country’s growth since the 2008-2009 slowdown. Such concerns also 
relate to unemployment, particularly among South Korea’s youth, as the chaebol employ a small 
share of South Korea’s population despite producing an outsized share of the country’s GDP.150 
The 2012 presidential election was largely fought over the issues of governance (in the wake of a 
number of corruption scandals), social welfare, and rising income inequality. Leading figures in 
both parties, including President Park, have proposed ways to expand South Korea’s social safety 
net. As mentioned in the politics section below, lower-than-expected growth in 2013 and 2014 
contributed to Park’s scaling back her plans. South Korea has one of the lowest rates of social 
welfare spending in the industrialized world, a problem exacerbated by the already high levels of 
indebtedness of the average South Korean household. The rapid aging of the South Korean 
population is expected to create additional financial pressures on government expenditures in the 
future.  
Currency Issues 
Given its dependence on international trade, fluctuations in currency valuations can have 
significant impacts on the South Korean economy. The won’s depreciation during the 2008-2009 
global financial crisis, when it fell by nearly a third to around 1,500 won per dollar, helped to 
stimulate South Korea’s economic recovery by making its exports cheaper relative to many other 
currencies, particularly the Japanese yen. A primary concern in more recent years, however, has 
been the devaluation of the Japanese yen. From mid-2012 to mid-2015 the Japanese yen 
depreciated against the dollar and the won by roughly 40%. The yen’s devaluation has in part been 
caused by expansionary monetary policies in Japan, as part of Prime Minister Abe’s focus on 
stimulating the Japanese economy. The yen’s fall has boosted Japanese exports and proven 
politically unpopular with its trade partners, including the United States and South Korea. 
President Park criticized the yen’s fall at the November 2014 summit of G-20 leaders.151 
Over the years, South Korean exchange rate policies periodically have been a source of 
consternation in U.S.-Korea relations, with some observers arguing that South Korea has 
artificially depressed the value of the won in order to gain a trade advantage by making its exports 
cheaper in other countries’ markets.152 However, in its October 2016 report to Congress on 
exchange rates, the Treasury Department stated that after several years of interventions aimed at 
resisting the appreciation of the won, since mid-2015, South Korea has on net intervened in 
foreign exchange markets primarily to limit the won’s depreciation, selling an estimated $24 
billion in foreign exchange. The report still urges South Korea to limit its interventions and to be 
more transparent in its foreign exchange operations (South Korea does not publicly report its 
interventions in foreign exchange markets).153 The report also implements a statutory requirement 
included in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, requiring Treasury to 
identify countries for more intensive currency policy evaluation on the basis of three economic 
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indicators. South Korea was one of six countries that met two of the three criteria.154 It was found 
to have both a significant trade surplus and material current account surplus with the United 
States, but it did not satisfy the third criteria of large persistent one-sided intervention in foreign 
exchange markets. 
South Korea Joins the AIIB 
In March 2015, South Korea announced it was applying to join the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB is a new China-led multilateral development bank consisting 
of over 50 countries.155 This move, which also was taken by a number of other U.S. allies such as 
the United Kingdom and Australia, was reportedly done over the objections of the Obama 
Administration, which opted not to join.156 The AIIB has generated controversy. Some analysts 
say it will help Asian countries meet their infrastructure investment needs. However, some 
analysts and policymakers also have raised concerns about the transparency and governance of 
China-funded development projects and see the AIIB proposal potentially undermining decades 
of efforts by the United States and others to improve governance, environmental, social, and 
procurement standards at the multilateral development banks.  
Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Cooperation 
Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation 
The United States and South Korea have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for 
nearly 60 years.157 This cooperation includes commercial projects as well as research and 
development work on safety, safeguards, advanced nuclear reactors, and fuel cycle technologies. 
On June 15, 2015, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed a renewal of their civilian 
nuclear cooperation agreement, known as a “123 agreement.”158 The agreement provides the legal 
foundation for nuclear trade between the countries; it provides the legal foundation for export 
licensing.159 The new agreement’s duration is 20 years, after which it automatically will renew for 
an additional five-year period unless either or both parties choose to withdraw. The two 
governments initialed the text of the agreement in April 2015.160 An agreement did not require an 
affirmative vote of approval from Congress. It entered into force on November 25, 2015, after a 
mandatory congressional review period. During her October 2015 visit to Washington DC, 
President Park described the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as one of the three “major 
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155 For more on the AIIB, see CRS In Focus IF10154, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, by Martin A. Weiss. 
156 “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Economist, March 17, 2015. 
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institutional frameworks of our alliance,” alongside the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty 
and the KORUS FTA.161  
The agreement provides for a new high-level bilateral commission (HLBC) where the two sides 
would review cooperation under the agreement. The HLBC held its first meeting on April 14, 
2016. The commission is to “serve as a senior-level forum to facilitate strategic dialogue and 
technical exchanges on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two countries.” It will provide a 
discussion forum about “management of spent nuclear fuel, the promotion of nuclear exports and 
export control cooperation, assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and nuclear security.”162  
Both countries have called the new agreement a success. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun 
Byung-Se said that the agreement was “future-oriented” and would facilitate “modern and 
mutually beneficial cooperation.” U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz said that the agreement 
would solidify the alliance and would “enable expanded cooperation between our respective 
nuclear industries, and reaffirm our two governments’ shared commitment to nonproliferation.”  
The future of fuel cycle technology in South Korea was a contentious issue during the negotiation 
of the new section 123 agreement. The United States has a long-term nonproliferation policy of 
discouraging the spread of fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) technology to new states.163 
This is because enrichment and reprocessing can create new fuel or material for nuclear weapons. 
Many South Korean officials and politicians see U.S. policy as limiting South Korea’s national 
sovereignty by requiring U.S. permission (as required under U.S. law) for the use of U.S.-
obligated fuel in certain sensitive civilian nuclear activities. The two countries resolved earlier 
disagreements over these issues. According to a State Department Fact Sheet, the agreement 
requires “express reciprocal consent rights over any retransfers or subsequent reprocessing or 
enrichment of material subject to the agreement.” However, the agreement does give South Korea 
advance permission to ship U.S.-obligated spent fuel overseas for reprocessing into mixed-oxide 
fuel. There are no current plans to do so, but South Korea may consider this option in developing 
a strategy for managing its growing spent fuel stocks. The agreement allows for enrichment up to 
20% of fissile uranium-235 in South Korea, after consultation through the bilateral commission 
and further written agreement by the United States. This provision was not part of the previous 
agreement. South Korea does not have an enrichment capability, but was seeking language in the 
new agreement that would open the door to that possibility. Enrichment at low levels can be used 
for nuclear fuel. The agreement also includes U.S. fuel supply assurances. 
For decades, the United States and South Korea have worked on joint research and development 
projects to address spent fuel. In the 1990s, the two countries worked intensely on research and 
development on a different fuel recycling technology (the “DUPIC” process), but this technology 
ultimately was not commercialized. In the past decade, joint research has centered on 
pyroprocessing. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a 
laboratory-scale research program on reprocessing spent fuel with an advanced pyroprocessing 
technique. U.S.-South Korean bilateral research on pyroprocessing began in 2002 under the 
Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (I-NERI). R&D work 
on pyroprocessing was temporarily halted by the United States in 2008, due to the proliferation 
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sensitivity of the technology. In an attempt to find common ground and continue bilateral 
research, in October 2010 the United States and South Korea began a 10-year Joint Fuel Cycle 
Study on the economics, technical feasibility, and nonproliferation implications of spent fuel 
disposition, including pyroprocessing. In July 2013, a new agreement on R&D technology 
transfer for joint pyroprocessing work in the United States took effect as part of the Joint Fuel 
Cycle Study.164 
Spent fuel disposal is a key policy issue for South Korean officials, and some see pyroprocessing 
as a potential solution. While South Korean reactor-site spent fuel pools are filling up, the 
construction of new spent fuel storage facilities is highly unpopular with the public. Some 
officials argue that in order to secure public approval for an interim storage site, the government 
needs to provide a long-term plan for the spent fuel. However, some experts point out that by-
products of spent fuel reprocessing would still require long-term storage and disposal options. 
Other proponents of pyroprocessing see it as a way to advance energy independence for South 
Korea.  
While some in the Korean nuclear research community have argued for development of 
pyroprocessing technology, the level of consensus over the pyroprocessing option among Korean 
government agencies, private sector/electric utilities, and the public remains uncertain. Generally, 
there appears to be support in South Korea for research and development, but some analysts are 
concerned about the economic and technical viability of commercializing the technology. While 
the R&D phase would be paid for by the government, the private sector would bear the costs of 
commercialization. At a political level, pyroprocessing may have more popularity as a symbol of 
South Korean technical advancement and the possibility of energy independence. However, other 
public voices are concerned about safety issues related to nuclear energy as a whole. Others see 
fuel cycle capabilities as part of a long-term nuclear reactor export strategy, envisioning that 
South Korea could have the independent ability to provide fuel and take back waste from new 
nuclear power countries in order to increase its competitive edge when seeking power plant 
export contracts. 
Some analysts critical of the development of pyroprocessing in South Korea point to the 1992 
Joint Declaration, in which North and South Korea agreed they would not “possess nuclear 
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” and are concerned about the impact of South 
Korea’s pyroprocessing on negotiations with the North. Some observers, particularly in South 
Korea, point out that the United States has given India and Japan consent to reprocess, and argue 
that they should be allowed to develop this technology under safeguards. Since the technology 
has not been commercialized anywhere in the world, the United States and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are working with the South Korean government to develop 
appropriate IAEA safeguards should the technology be developed further. Whether 
pyroprocessing technology can be sufficiently monitored to detect diversion to a weapons 
program is a key aspect of the Joint Study, which is expected to be concluded in 2020. 
South Korean Nonproliferation Policy 
South Korea has been a consistent and vocal supporter of strengthening the global 
nonproliferation regime, which is a set of treaties, voluntary export control arrangements, and 
other policy coordination mechanisms that work to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and their delivery systems. South Korea destroyed all of its chemical weapons 
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stocks by 2008, under the Chemical Weapons Convention.165 South Korea is a member of the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), which controls sensitive nuclear technology trade, and adheres 
to all international nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes. South Korea also 
participates in the G-8 Global Partnership, and other U.S.-led initiatives—the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly 
GNEP), and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. South Korea has contributed 
funds to the United States’ nuclear smuggling prevention effort, run by the Department of Energy, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voluntary fund and to the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Trust Fund to support the destruction of Syrian 
chemical weapons. 
South Korea is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which requires countries to 
conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An 
Additional Protocol (AP) to South Korea’s safeguards agreement entered into force as of 
February 2004. The AP gives the IAEA increased monitoring authority over the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. In the process of preparing a more complete declaration of nuclear activities 
in the country, the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) disclosed previously 
undeclared experiments in its research laboratories on uranium enrichment in 2000, and on 
plutonium extraction in 1982. The IAEA Director General reported on these undeclared activities 
to the Board of Governors in September 2004, but the Board did not report them to the U.N. 
Security Council. In response, the Korean government reconfirmed its cooperation with the IAEA 
and commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reorganized the oversight of activities 
at KAERI. The experiments reminded the international community of South Korea’s plans for a 
plutonium-based nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s under President Park Chung Hee, 
the father of the current President Park. At that time, deals to acquire reprocessing and other 
facilities were canceled under intense U.S. pressure, and Park Chung Hee eventually abandoned 
weapons plans in exchange for U.S. security assurances. The original motivations for obtaining 
fuel cycle facilities as well as the undeclared experiments continue to cast a shadow over South 
Korea’s long-held pursuit of the full fuel cycle. As a result, since 2004, South Korea has aimed to 
improve transparency of its nuclear programs and participate fully in the global nonproliferation 
regime. In addition, the 1992 Joint Declaration between North and South Korea says that the 
countries “shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” Since North 
Korea has openly pursued both of these technologies, some debate whether South Korea should 
still be bound by those commitments. Some analysts are concerned that a denuclearization 
agreement with North Korea could be jeopardized if South Korea does not uphold the 1992 
agreement.  
South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, a forum initiated by President Obama 
shortly after his inauguration. The South Korean government agreed to host the summit because it 
fit into the “Global Korea” concept of international leadership and summitry; it was a chance for 
the South Korean nuclear industry to showcase its accomplishments; and the South Korean 
government was able to emphasize South Korea’s role as a responsible actor in the nuclear field, 
in stark contrast with North Korea. It was also seen as an important symbol of trust between the 
U.S. and South Korean Presidents. South Korea will continue its leadership in the nuclear 
security field by chairing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Conference on 
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Nuclear Security in Vienna in December 2016. South Korea is also cooperating with regional 
partners to establish a Center for Excellence in Nuclear Security. 
South Korean Politics 
South Korean politics continue to be dominated by Park Geun-hye (born in 1952) and her 
conservative Saenuri (“New Frontier”) Party (NFP), which controls the legislature. Park was 
elected in December 2012, becoming not only South Korea’s first woman president, but also the 
first presidential candidate to receive more than half of the vote (she captured 51.6%) since South 
Korea ended nearly three decades of authoritarian rule in 1988. She is to serve until February 
2018. By law, South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term. Park is the daughter of the 
late Park Chung Hee, who ruled South Korea from the time he seized power in a 1961 military 
coup until his assassination in 1979. 
According to the Asan Institute’s daily polling service, Park’s public approval ratings were in the 
60%-70% range for much of 2013, in part due to positive assessments of her handling of foreign 
affairs, particularly inter-Korean relations. However, sentiments toward Park’s government 
dropped sharply following the April 2014 sinking of the Sewol ferry in the waters off the 
country’s western coast. The deaths of nearly 300 passengers—mostly high school students—for 
months cast a pall over South Korea and over the Park government. The tragedy’s political impact 
has been likened to the political effects of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster in the United 
States.166 The Park government has been criticized for rescuers’ allegedly slow response to 
distress calls, and the sinking has prompted South Koreans to ask questions about how well 
government agencies have enforced safety regulations, which the Sewol was found to have 
violated, about the relationship between government regulators and the industries they oversee, as 
well as whether companies put profits ahead of safety. Several of the Sewol’s ownership group 
and its crew have been convicted of gross negligence, including the captain, who fled the ship 
without attempting to help the passengers. 
Park also has been weakened by perceptions that her government has done little to follow through 
on her campaign pledges to overcome South Korea’s economic difficulties and strengthen its 
social safety net. Due to personal or political scandals, a series of Park’s appointees—including 
three successive appointees to be prime minister—withdrew their names before taking office.167 
These developments have raised questions about her government’s (and her) competence and 
willingness to reach outside her inner circle. Most recently, in spring 2015, a new scandal arose 
for Park’s government when a South Korean businessman, who later committed suicide, stated 
that he had provided bribes to several former close aides to Park. The then-sitting prime minister 
was implicated in the bribery scandal, and he subsequently resigned after only two months in 
office. Additionally, the government has struggled against criticism that it mishandled the 
mounting evidence that the country’s intelligence service tried to influence the 2012 presidential 
election in Park’s favor (though no evidence has surfaced that she knew of the matter). 
A Powerful Executive Branch  
Nominally, power in South Korea is shared by the president and the 300-member unicameral 
National Assembly. Of these, 246 members represent single-member constituencies. The 
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remaining 54 are selected on the basis of proportional voting. National Assembly members are 
elected to four-year terms. The president and the central bureaucracy continue to be the dominant 
forces in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National 
Assembly from initiating major pieces of legislation.  
Political Parties 
Presently, there are two major political parties in South Korea: President Park’s conservative 
Saenuri Party (which has been translated as “New Frontier Party” or NFP) and the opposition, 
center-left Minjoo (Democratic) Party.168 The NFP and its predecessor party have controlled the 
Blue House since 2008 and controlled the National Assembly from 2008-2016. U.S. ties have 
historically been much stronger with South Korea’s conservative parties.  
South Korea’s progressive political parties controlled the Blue House for 10 years, from 1998 to 
2008. For a four-year period, from 2004 to 2008, a progressive party was the largest political 
group in the National Assembly and held a majority for part of that period. After failing to retake 
the Blue House or National Assembly in 2012 elections, the progressive camp faced several more 
years without significant tools of power and influence within the South Korean polity. Since 
2008, the party has splintered and merged with other parties on multiple occasions, changing its 
name three times in the process. In the past, the Minjoo Party’s predecessor parties have 
advocated positions that, if adopted, could pose challenges for the Obama Administration’s Korea 
policy, including calling for the renegotiation of some provisions of the KORUS FTA, and 
adopting a more conciliatory approach to North Korea.  
 
                                                 
168 The Saenuri Party formerly was known as the Grand National Party (GNP). The New Politics Alliance for 
Democracy formerly was known as the Democratic Party. 
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A Short History of South Korean Presidential Changes 
For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruled by authoritarian 
governments. The most important of these was led by President Park’s father, Park Chung Hee, a general who seized 
power in a military coup in 1961 and ruled until he was murdered by his intelligence chief in 1979. The elder Park’s 
legacy is a controversial one. On the one hand, he orchestrated the industrialization of South Korea that transformed 
the country from one of the world’s poorest. On the other hand, he ruled with an iron hand and brutally dealt with 
real and perceived opponents, be they opposition politicians, labor activists, or civil society leaders. For instance, in 
the early 1970s South Korean government agents twice tried to kill then-opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who in the 
second attempt was saved only by U.S. intervention. The divisions that opened under Park continue to be felt today. 
Conservative South Koreans tend to emphasize his economic achievements, while progressives focus on his human 
rights abuses. 
Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government protests forced the country’s military rulers to enact 
sweeping democratic reforms, democratic institutions and traditions have deepened in South Korea. In 1997, long-
time dissident Kim Dae Jung was elected to the presidency, the first time an opposition party had prevailed in a South 
Korean presidential election. In December 2002, Kim was succeeded by a member of his left-of-center party: Roh 
Moo-hyun, a self-educated former human rights lawyer who emerged from relative obscurity to defeat establishment 
candidates in both the primary and general elections. Roh campaigned on a platform of reform—reform of Korean 
politics, economic policymaking, and U.S.-ROK relations. He was elected in part because of his embrace of massive 
anti-American protests that ensued after a U.S. military vehicle killed two Korean schoolgirls in 2002. Like Kim Dae 
Jung, Roh pursued a “sunshine policy” of largely unconditional engagement with North Korea that clashed with the 
harder policy line pursued by the Bush Administration until late 2006. Roh also alarmed U.S. policymakers by speaking 
of a desire that South Korea should play a “balancing” role among China, the United States, and Japan in Northeast 
Asia. Despite this, under Roh’s tenure, South Korea deployed over 3,000 non-combat troops to Iraq—the third-
largest contingent in the international coalition—and the two sides initiated and signed the KORUS FTA. 
In the December 2007 election, former Seoul mayor Lee Myung-bak’s victory restored conservatives to the 
presidency. Among other items, Lee was known for ushering in an unprecedented level of cooperation with the 
United States over North Korea and for steering South Korea through the worst of the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis. Under the slogan “Global Korea,” he also pursued a policy of expanding South Korea’s participation in and 
leadership of various global issues. During the final two years of his presidency, however, Lee’s public approval ratings 
fell to the 25%-35% level, driven down by—among other factors—a series of scandals surrounding some of his 
associates and family members, and by an increasing concern among more Koreans about widening income disparities 
between the wealthy and the rest of society.  
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